A game theory approach to negotiations in defense acquisitions in the context of value-driven design: an aircraft system case study by Bhatia, Garima Vinay
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2016
A game theory approach to negotiations in defense
acquisitions in the context of value-driven design:
an aircraft system case study
Garima Vinay Bhatia
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Aerospace Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bhatia, Garima Vinay, "A game theory approach to negotiations in defense acquisitions in the context of value-driven design: an aircraft
system case study" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 15100.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/15100
  
!
A game theory approach to negotiations in defense acquisitions in the context of value-
driven design: An aircraft system case study 
 
by 
 
Garima Vinay Bhatia  
 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Major: Aerospace Engineering 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Christina Bloebaum, Major Professor  
Ran Dai 
 Leifur Leifsson 
 
 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2016 
 
Copyright © Garima Vinay Bhatia, 2016. All rights reserved
ii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Aastha, my forever inspiration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
              Page 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... vi 
NOMENCLATURE .................................................................................................. vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................... viii 
ABSTRACT………………………………. .............................................................. vi 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................ 4 
 Research Question 1 ............................................................................................ 4 
 Research Question 2 ............................................................................................ 5 
 Organization of Thesis ......................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 7 
 Defense Acquisitions ........................................................................................... 8 
 Systems Engineering ............................................................................................ 17 
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization ............................................................... 19 
 Value-Driven Design ........................................................................................... 20 
 Theory of Bargaining ........................................................................................... 21 
 
CHAPTER 4 AIRCRAFT MODEL ..................................................................... 23 
CHAPTER 5  VALUE FUNCTIONS.................................................................... 28 
 Value Functions for Company ............................................................................. 28 
iv 
 
 
 Value Functions for Government ......................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER 6 NEGOTIATIONS IN A COMBINED PRICE AND  
PERFORMANCE-BASED VALUE CONTRACTING SCENARIO ...................... 33 
 Task 1: Impact of Beginning the Bargaining Game on Payoffs  ......................... 46 
CHAPTER 7 NEGOTIATIONS OVER ATTRIBUTES USING VDD ............... 49 
 Bargain Model  .................................................................................................... 50 
 Optimal Values for Contractor  ............................................................................ 52 
 Optimal Values for Government  ......................................................................... 54 
 Bargaining over Attributes  .................................................................................. 55 
 Task 1: Random Bargaining  ............................................................................... 59 
CHAPTER 8  SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................. 62 
 Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................... 62 
 Future Work ......................................................................................................... 63 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 64 
APPENDIX A AIRCRAFT MODEL ....................................................................... 68 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
                                                                                                                                       Page 
Figure 1 Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life 
  Cycle Management System ........................................................................ 10 
Figure 2  An Overview of CBA ................................................................................ 13 
Figure 3 Systems Engineering V-model .................................................................. 18 
Figure 4  Multidisciplinary Design Feasible (MDF) Framework ............................. 19 
Figure 5 Value-Driven Design Process .................................................................... 21 
Figure 6 Mission Profile for Aircraft ....................................................................... 23 
Figure 7 Hierarchical Decomposition of Aircraft Model ......................................... 24 
Figure 8 Discipline-based DSM for Aircraft Model ................................................ 24 
Figure 9 Contractor’s Profit as a Function of Price .................................................. 36 
Figure 10  Hierarchy for Example Problem .............................................................. 51 
Figure 11  Design of Aircraft Using Contractor’s Optimal Attribute Set .................. 53 
Figure 12  Design of Aircraft Using Government’s Optimal Attribute Set .............. 54 
Figure 13  Game of Bargaining for Example Problem .............................................. 56 
Figure 14  Final System Design after Bargaining over Attributes ............................ 58 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
                                                                                                                                  Page 
Table 1 Description of Design Variables ................................................................ 24 
Table 2 Description of Behavior Variables ............................................................. 25 
Table 3 Results from Optimization in Combined Contracting ............................... 35 
Table 4 Contractor Profit for Different Return Rates in Combined Contracting .... 35 
Table 5 Threshold Prices for Government and Contractor in Combined 
  Contracting ................................................................................................. 38 
Table 6 Results of the Game Using Combined Contracting ................................... 39 
Table 7 Results from Optimization using CBA ...................................................... 42 
Table 8 Contractor Profit for Different Return Rates Using CBA ......................... 42 
Table 9 Threshold Prices for Government and Contracting Using CBA ............... 44 
Table 10 Results of the Game Using CBA ............................................................... 44 
Table 11 Comparison of CBA and Combined Acquisitions ..................................... 45 
Table 12 Result of Reversed Order Game Using Combined Contracting ................ 46 
Table 13 Result of Reversed Order Game Using CBA ............................................ 47 
Table 14 Optimal Attribute Values for Company ..................................................... 53 
Table 15 Optimal Attribute Values for Government ................................................ 54 
Table 16 Results for Bargaining Over Attributes for Example Problem .................. 55 
Table 17 Results for Bargaining Over Attributes for Aircraft Example 
  (Sequential) ................................................................................................ 57 
Table 18 Final System Design and Values (Sequential Bargaining) ........................ 58 
Table 19 Final System Design and Values (Random Bargaining) ........................... 61 
vii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. 
Christina Bloebaum for her continuous support and guidance. I could not have imagined 
having a better advisor for my Masters program. 
I would also like to thank the rest of my committee members, Dr. Ran Dai and Dr. 
Leifur Leifsson, for their encouragement and constructive criticism. My sincere thanks also 
goes to Dr. Hanumanthrao Kannan, who closely mentored, encouraged and helped me 
immensely throughout the course of my research. 
I wish to thank my friends and fellow lab mates Ben, Subu, David, Chris, Suresh, 
Nazareen and Akash for easing the struggle and making my time at Iowa State University a 
wonderful experience. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents without whose unconditional 
love, support, and belief in me, this would not have been possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
viii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The acquisition of weapon systems in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
is an extremely complex procedure involving hundreds of thousands of individuals, right from 
contracting through design and manufacturing to the sustainment and finally the disposal of 
the system. The complete acquisitions process involves a number of milestones spanning the 
entire life of the program. Traditionally, all defense acquisition programs follow a 
requirements-driven systems engineering approach, where requirements are formed by the 
buyer or the Department of Defense (DoD), and a cost-based method is generally used to award 
contracts and develop systems in a bid to minimize costs. However, even with an approach 
that focuses on cost, there usually exist tremendous budget overruns and time delays in the 
development of such large scale complex weapon systems, which has been a major concern 
for the government in recent times. 
Recently, there has been a shift of focus from cost-based acquisitions to a price-based 
and performance-based approach, however, the underlying idea behind these methods is still 
the fulfillment of requirements. These approaches have their own shortcomings, and problems 
with MDAPs still persist.  Value-Driven Design is a new design philosophy that intends to 
capture the true preferences of stakeholders by means of a meaningful mathematical function 
called value function as opposed to using requirements which only serve as proxies to the true 
preferences. Researchers have proposed the use of value-based approaches for the acquisition 
of weapon systems in recent times.  
This thesis exploits the use of these new approaches in the negotiations phase of 
defense acquisition, which forms a crucial phase just before the final contract is written. The 
first part of this research looks at a transition from requirements to value, by proposing a price 
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and performance-based value approach to defense acquisitions, whereas the second part is 
based completely on value. The aim of the research is to maximize the payoffs to both the 
government and the contractor developing the weapon system for the government. In this 
research, the ideas of bargaining from game theory have been proposed in an effort to provide 
a mathematical foundation to negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
With the increase in the complex nature of systems, the design process has become more 
tedious than ever. The coordination and involvement of multiple organizations and a workforce of 
thousands are the crucial components in the design and development of LSCES. Complex 
interactions or tight couplings between the components of the systems, the long development times 
and the extremely large costs associated with this development are some of the other characteristics 
of LSCES [2]. The design process involves decision-making at each level of the organizational 
hierarchy as well as across organizations. These LSCES often interact with other LSCES in order 
to fulfill their operational purpose, thus adding to the complexity of these systems. A satellite and 
its launch vehicle are an example of such interaction. An example of an organization dealing with 
the design of large scale systems on a global level is The Boeing Company, that employed 162,715 
people including both the commercial and defense sectors, as of 29th October 2015 [3]. 
A large number of commercial organizations are involved in producing weapon systems 
for national defense as are required by the Department of Defense (DoD) or the government [4]. 
These complexity associated with such weapon systems is usually greater than that of civil aircraft 
due to the state of art technology that goes into these systems and also keeping into mind the 
conditions under which these systems operate [5]. Another distinguishing feature between the 
realms of the commercial and the military world is the development times associated with these 
aircraft, with the military aircraft systems taking almost four times as long to develop as compared 
to the civil sector [6]. 
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Needless to say, the process associated with the acquisition of these systems also differs 
considerably. The defense acquisition procedures are highly complex and extremely difficult to 
fathom. As quoted from a RAND report of 2009 on defense acquisition, according to senior policy 
researcher Jeffrey Drezner, “The products of the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process 
are perceived as becoming increasingly complex, emphasizing multifunction and multimission 
system configurations.… The management and oversight of these complex programs have 
similarly become more complex. Changes may be needed in the organizations and procedures used 
to manage the development, production, and sustainment of these complex weapon systems.” [7] 
Traditionally, cost-based acquisition has been used as the method of acquiring weapon 
systems in which the DoD calls out for proposals from participating contractor, and the contractor 
offering the best system at the least cost is awarded the contract. However, this method has led to 
tremendous cost and schedule overruns, as will be discussed in a later section of the thesis [8]. 
Reforms to the traditional methods such as price and performance-based contracting have been 
introduced, but these methods have their own drawbacks, which also be explained elaborately in 
further chapters.  The contracting process involves a number of stages to support the acquisition 
of the system [9]. One of the crucial ones of these is the negotiation that takes place between the 
buyer and the contractor just before the final contract is written. Negotiation may take place over 
the price or some part of the contract that the government may not be satisfied with. This thesis 
focuses on improving the negotiation procedure by the use of the theory of bargaining with an aim 
to achieve an optimal system design. The thesis comprises of two parts – Part 1 aims at combining 
price-based, performance-based and value-based acquisitions in order to improve the final design 
of the system, whereas part 2 proposes a new form of bargaining, that over the attributes of the 
system. The idea behind the latter part is that the attributes reflect the true preference of operational 
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success of the government and the price is used just as a proxy. Both the aforementioned ideas are 
centered on the negotiation phase of the acquisitions process, and aim at studying the effect on the 
characteristics of the system obtained and its price by implementing these ideas. Both the ideas 
also try to address a transition from requirements to value, as value is used as a payoff evaluator 
in both the cases. 
The following chapter concisely describes the two research questions developed for this 
research and the approach to addressing each of the questions, as well as the sub-tasks involved in 
both. 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This chapter describes the research questions that were formed to initiate the new 
approaches to improve the current defense acquisitions processes.  
 
Research Question 1 
“Can a game theory enhanced value approach to negotiations in a combined priced and 
performance-based contracting scenario lead to a better system design as compared to that obtained 
by using the traditional requirements-driven method?” 
This research question will be addressed by creating a negotiation model that uses a 
performance based requirement stated by the DoD to determine the price associated with an aircraft 
example test case, to be designed by a contractor that represents a commercial organization, and 
then using a value model to create a game of bargaining between the players (government and 
contractor) over this established price to reflect the final price of the system and its characteristics. 
Task 1 
One of the tasks for this research question will be to investigate the effect of player order 
in the game of bargaining. This will be accomplished by changing the order of the player making 
the first offer from the main research question, and examining the effects on the player payoffs for 
doing this. 
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 Research Question 2 
“Can a value approach combined with negotiation over attributes be used to bridge the gap between 
the preferences of the government and the contractor in a defense acquisitions context for weapon 
systems?” 
This research question will be used to investigate a bargaining over system attributes, a 
new form of bargaining, in order to explore the effects on the value to the stakeholders. No cost 
consideration on the part of the government will be taken into account initially, and two attribute 
sets will be found that will represent the attribute values yielding the maximum payoff (in this case 
the value) to both the stakeholders respectively. The attributes will be those that are common to 
the values of both the players. A bargain model will be constructed to study a negotiation over one 
of the attributes and the effect of this negotiation on the values to both the players. The final set of 
attributes achieved will be used to determine the payoffs (values) obtained by both the players, as 
well as check for the final price to be paid by the government. 
Task 1 
The task for this research question will be to investigate a game of random bargaining, 
where there is no definite sequence to making offers. The formulation of the bargain model will 
be similar to the main research question, however, in this model, a probability will be included 
that will associate the player payoffs to making offers in the game. The same value functions will 
be used to evaluate the payoffs as above. 
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Organization of Thesis 
Chapters 1 and 2 provided an overview of the issues with the current defense acquisition 
methods and the motivation behind the research and also defined the specific research questions 
addressed in this thesis. Chapter 3 will provide the necessary background required for proceeding 
through the thesis and understanding the topics addressed in this research. Chapter 4 will focus on 
describing the aircraft model designed to be used as a test bed for this study. Chapter 5 will give 
details about the various value functions that can be used by the government and the company and 
also define in detail the value functions particularly used in this research. Chapters 6 and 7 will 
delve in to the core result and contain the results and discussions. Chapter 6 will specifically focus 
on the proposed new combined contracting or research question 1, whereas chapter 7 will describe 
negotiation over attributes or research question 2. The final Chapter, Chapter 8, will summarize 
the research and state some of the future work for the research and the possible areas that could be 
explored. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                           
BACKGROUND 
The design of Large-Scale Complex Engineered Systems (LSCES) is extremely difficult 
to address as a whole as these systems are characterized by their extreme complexity and 
multidisciplinary nature. Numerous people belonging to different disciplines often spanning across 
various geographical locations work towards the design of a single system that takes long times 
(even decades) to develop and whose development costs often surpass the billion dollar mark [10, 
11]. 
Traditionally, the requirements-driven Systems Engineering (SE) approach is used to 
design these LSCES. The needs of the customer are translated into requirements which are formed 
at the top level and then flowed down the hierarchy of the organization to assist each subsystem 
design team in the design process [12]. However, requirements only serve as proxies to the true 
preferences of the stakeholder. Value-Driven Design is a new design philosophy that intends to 
capture these true preferences by means of a meaning mathematical function called value function. 
This is a single unit function (usually monetary) which is decomposed down to the lowest level, 
enabling consistency in preferences and design decision-making so as to enable an optimal system 
design [13]. 
Value models will be used extensively in this thesis to highlight the advantages of 
designing for value in defense acquisitions over traditional requirements, and the combined 
contracting will use both requirements and value, which could well serve as a transition from 
requirements to value. The second research question will only focus on value. The aircraft model 
used to perform the study consists of three disciplines, and multidisciplinary analysis and 
optimization will be necessary to address the couplings in the model and to obtain system 
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consistency, as has been investigated in multiple studies [14]. The content in this chapter describes 
the defense acquisition process in detail and sheds light on bargain modeling, as well as gives an 
overview about traditional systems engineering, value-driven design and multidisciplinary design 
optimization. 
Defense Acquisitions 
Procurement refers to the purchase of any good or service. The term ‘acquisition’ is broader 
and refers to the entire life cycle of the good or service, right from design and engineering to 
construction to sustainment and finally to disposal. The defense acquisition process is extremely 
complicated and with more than $314 billion at stake annually, these programs attract too much 
attention as it is the taxpayers’ money that is being put to use [15, 16]. There was an increased 
emphasis on cost cuts post the Cold War due to limited budgets allotted to defense. This caused a 
shift of focus from increased performance to reduced costs in defense acquisitions [17-19]. As a 
result, there have resulted various types of contracts that target to reduce the price of the system to 
the government. There exist different types of contracts that are followed by the DoD under 
different circumstances, and the policies for these contracts are dictated by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) [20, 21]. 
The dynamics of the acquisition program however change based on the market for the 
system being obtained and the government cannot always necessary control the price of the 
systems it purchases. For certain weapon systems, there may exist a monopsony (when there is a 
single buyer in the market), with the government playing the monopsonist. In such a case, one may 
assume that the DoD that represents the government in the defense acquisition programs will have 
complete control over the price of the system; this however, may not necessarily be true. The 
government’s power to determine the price is dictated by external factors such as sudden national 
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threats, cases of war or no immediate requirement of weapon systems during times of peace. In 
any caser, the quantity of systems desired by the government changes, which affects the cost to 
the contractor, thus taking away the government’s ability to single-handedly influence the price 
[22]. 
In other cases of monopolies (single seller), the price determining power is withdrawn from 
the government as the sellers ability to influence the worth of the system is highly elevated, which 
again puts the government in a difficult situation [23, 24]. However, even in the case involving 
multiple contractors, an oligopoly may exist (contractors grouping together) which again is a 
disadvantage to the DoD as it cannot be the lone influencer of the price of the system [22]. 
Underbidding and software proprietary to the contractor are other issues that lead to cost overruns 
to the DoD in the long run even if the initial decided prices are within budget [25]. Due to the 
above reasons, there have been a number of attempts to reform the defense acquisition procedures. 
There has been an increased emphasis on the shift from cost and price based acquisitions to those 
that are more operationally focused. The concept of value in acquisitions over the traditional 
requirements-driven approach is also gaining momentum with the idea being to capture the true 
preference of the government rather than using the proxies of price or cost. The following section 
gives an overview of cost-based, priced-based and performance-based acquisitions as well as a 
description of the new value approach to defense acquisitions. 
Cost-Based Acquisitions (CBA) 
This is a traditional defense acquisition process that involves an in-depth cost analysis to 
be conducted on the part of the contractor, and a detailed report of this cost analysis is to be 
submitted to the DoD. The DoD reviews the proposals submitted by all the contractors 
participating in the acquisition program, and based on the best bid, usually a cost plus fee, generally 
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called a cost plus contract, is written. A cost plus contract is one in where the fee is the 
supplemental amount awarded to the contractor over the cost incurred by him, and the fee is 
generally a pre-decided percentage of the cost [26, 27]. A major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) as a whole is an exhausting process and involves a number of milestones, right from 
developing requirements to award of contract to development of the system and its sustainment to 
its disposal. Fig. 1 depicts a chart created by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) that tries 
to show the entire defense acquisition process on a single page, and the complex nature of this 
process can be realized by looking at this chart. 
Because this research is concerned with the process of award of contracts, particularly the 
negotiations phase, an overview of a typical CBA program and its various stages involved in the 
pre-award phase are described in Fig. 2. A brief description of each of the activities preceding the 
!
Figure 1. Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management 
System [1]. 
!
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System Development and Demonstration (SDD), where a contractor is selected to develop the 
weapon system, follows [28]. 
•! Determine requirements: The DoD forms requirements to describe what the system is, it’s 
expected behavior, a general idea of the cost and development time among others. This 
process may be quite elaborate and may involve a number of studies and analysis, which 
may result in this phase itself taking a number of years. Requirements are developed using 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process [29, 30]. 
•! Conduct market research: The DoD conducts a market research to determine if there 
already exist systems that fit the requirements or for the existence of current systems that 
may be modified to meet the requirements developed by the DoD. The extent of the market 
research depends on a number of factors and varies from system to system [31, 32]. 
•! Develop acquisition strategy and write acquisition plan: These include developing business 
plans, identifying the type of contract including incentives and terms and conditions, and 
also detailed forecasting such as cost and schedule relationships, competition sought and 
budget, among other considerations. This is followed by source selection, which involves 
identifying the best offerors of services, including contracting, legal and technical 
expertise, etc. 
•! Publish Government Point of Entry (GPE) Notice and distribute solicitation: A notice is 
published on the GPE website before a solicitation is issued in order to increase awareness 
and competition as well as involve participation of smaller businesses. The official 
solicitation or requests from the federal government for contractors to submit their 
proposals is released a fortnight after the notice. For weapon systems that involve 
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negotiations, the solicitation is generally called a request for proposal (RFP). The 
contractors are then provided with a 30-day period to submit their proposals [33]. 
•! Receive and evaluate proposals: Once the proposals are received from the competing 
contractors in the format desired by the government, each proposal is evaluated. The 
proposal must specify cost and technical details in the context of fulfilling the requirements 
specified in the RFP. The factors on which the evaluations are based must be pre-specified 
in the RFP. Based on the contractors’ cost details and technical solutions, the government 
does its own cost analysis, and the government’s estimated cost is then used instead of the 
costs provided by the contractors. The government evaluation teams also conduct thorough 
evaluations of various rates, such as labor, overhead, general, etc. in order to verify the 
authenticity of a contractor’s proposed costs [34].  
•! Conduct fact findings and discussions: This involves a physical visit to the contractor 
facilities where the system is to be developed and discussions with the contractors for 
clearer understanding of the proposals on the part of the Contracting Office (CO). The CO 
also informs the contractors of deficiencies or ways of improvement at this point. 
•! Request Final Proposals: The contractors submit their modified, at times completely 
revised final proposals, called the best and final offer (BAFO) after discussion with the 
CO. 
•! Evaluate final proposals, negotiate and write contracts: Another evaluation follows post 
submission of the BAFO, and this time it is mainly the final price and cost that are the 
focus. A contract is written for the winner, and this is also the point where the profit 
percentage is decided in the cost plus contract scenarios [35].  
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These steps are generally followed by briefings, decision approvals and post award audits, 
etc. The next phase involving Sole-Source contracting, or awarding the 
contract to a single contractor, which is generally the case in acquisition of 
weapon systems, is the one in which negotiations take place. Negotiations 
are conducted on aspects of the proposal that the CO does not agree with. 
When negotiating over the price, the DoD asks contractors for the actual 
cost, which is then used as a basis for the negotiation. The Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) ensures that the data provided by the contractor 
is accurate, or else the contractor is penalized heavily if found otherwise 
[36]. Following the negotiations, a document called Price Negotiation 
Memorandum is prepared to show how a fair and reasonable price for the 
weapon system was established [37].     
Drawbacks of CBA: 
Based on the available literature, certain drawbacks have been 
observed about CBA. In this form of acquisition, because the profit made 
by the contractor depends on the cost, there is no incentive on the part of the contractor to cut short 
the cost. This may lead to excessive cost overruns and may push the price paid by the DoD to the 
higher end of the spectrum. Also, because of the large costs involved in conducting a detailed cost 
analysis, a multitude of contractors may stay away from participating in the acquisition program, 
thus reducing competition and weakening the government’s hold over the price. Companies also 
consider cost data to be proprietary due to the competition involved, and may not be very pleased 
about sharing this data. Apart from these, under TINA, contractors are asked to provide cost data 
structures in specific government formats under a unique accounting system driven by the federal 
!
Figure 2. An Overview of 
CBA 
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Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), which may discourage civilian contractors lacking this 
government-unique accounting infrastructure from participating[28, 38, 39].  
Due to the disadvantages of CBA mentioned above, price-based acquisitions (PBA) were 
introduced in a bid to improve the defense acquisition processes, and are described in detail in the 
following section. 
Price-Based Acquisitions (PBA) 
  This form of acquisition was introduced as a reform to overcome the shortcomings of CBA 
stated in the previous section. At present, PBA is being advocated as a strong tool for improving 
cost and performance objectives, and is being considered for improvisation of MDAPs since a long 
time. The way that PBAs differ from CBAs is that they do not primarily require the contractor to 
supply cost data, and a contract is written based on a reasonable and fair price established without 
having knowledge of the cost [28, 40]. This, it is claimed, helps in saving overhead costs and also 
cuts down on the time required for the cost analysis, thereby promoting shorter schedules. This 
form of acquisition follows the same procedures as those described for the CBA process, however, 
it results in cost and schedule savings for the DoD in the proposal evaluation and fact finding phase 
as they do not have to go through the tedious process of reviewing the authenticity of extensive 
cost data supplied by the contractor. In PBA, the government conducts a broad market survey to 
determine the appropriate price of the system under consideration, which is followed by a 
negotiation between the DoD and the stakeholder to arrive upon a price that both agree with. The 
market research stage mentioned in the CBA process above takes a greater time and costs more in 
PBA because of the price market research involved. The company, however, ends up saving 
significant contracting costs as they do not have to carry out an in-depth cost analysis and submit 
a report in the government-approved documenting format. This results in promotion of wider 
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competition among the contractors and a greater number of companies participating in the 
acquisition process, which works to the advantage of the government.  
Drawbacks of PBA: 
Even though the above theory dictate that PBA lead to significant cost reductions when 
compared to CBA, a study conducted by RAND involving interviews with actual government and 
company officials found that in certain cases, the cost involved in conducting the cost analysis and 
preparing the proposal was a very small fraction of the total contracting cost. There may also occur 
cases where no pre-defined market exists for a system under consideration, which may make the 
price determination an arduous task for the government. The absence of actual cost structures in 
the contracting process may also lead to underbidding by the contractors to win the proposal, and 
then lead to an increased price for the DoD in a later period, or the DoD may be denied access to 
some cutting-edge technologies if the price were to be kept at the original bidding value. 
Another reform to the traditional acquisitions is the performance-based service acquisition 
(PBSA), where the emphasis is on the outcome of the service desired rather than the method by 
which the service is achieved, which is described in the next section. 
 
Performance-Based Service Acquisitions (PBSA) 
Under PBSA, there is a shift in the emphasis from contracting for resources, such as price 
or cost, to contracting for results. In essence, in these type of contracts, the government is only 
interested in the final payoff received rather than the process followed by the contractor to achieve 
the desired payoff from the system [41, 42]. This new acquisition reform is also sometimes referred 
to as Performance Based Logistics (PBL). The basic underlying framework of PBSA is that 
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operational requirements are identified and laid down by the government, and the contractor is 
incentivized with economic rewards for fulfilling the objectives. Clauses are also written down for 
the award of incentives if a better performance than the minimum stated is achieved, which may 
motivate the contractor to deliver a superior system to the government. On the other hand, the 
contract also provides for including penalties if the performance goals are not met.  
Although this type of contracting does give the contractor the freedom to pursue the 
development of the system in his desired way, there are certain drawbacks associated with PBSA. 
One of the key issues with these acquisition methods is the appropriate definition of the figures of 
merit that define the effectiveness of the desired system [43]. The other drawback is linking 
rewards or incentives to performance by means of a fair rewarding scheme, and further research is 
being put in to this sort of contracting. 
Although each of the contracting methods described above have their own advantages and 
disadvantages, each of them still rely primarily on requirements for defining the system, which 
predominantly state what is not required from the system, and play substitutes to the true 
preferences of the stakeholders. A new reform to these traditional methods is value-based 
acquisitions (VBA), where the system is designed for the true value to the stakeholders. A brief 
description of VBA is given in the following section. 
Value-Based Acquisitions (VBA) 
The concept of VBA overlaps in certain ways with the idea of performance-based 
acquisitions, and is focused on the operational attributes that define performance. The underlying 
idea behind these type of acquisitions is the development of a value model that correctly captures 
the tradeoffs between cost and performance by capturing the attributes defining the two criteria 
accurately. Once a quantifiable value model has been developed, the price paid for the system is 
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made a function of the value. This also provides as an incentive to the contractor to improve 
performance [44-46]. The use of value models helps in better preference communication and more 
informed decision-making, giving the designers more freedom to make design choices. Value 
models will be described in detail in a later section. VBA although much recent as compared to 
the traditional methods of contracting, is being realized as a form of acquisition holding 
tremendous potential for the future of defense acquisitions, and much research is being put in to 
it. 
Even though the each of the forms of acquisition described above have their own pros and 
cons, the acquisition process is usually tailored according to the needs of each individual program, 
and usually characteristics from different methods overlap. This research proposes using a 
combination of the price-based and performance-based contracting principles in a way that the 
contractor finally designs for value. In essence, it is taking the best of each of the three methods 
and combining them in to a single price and performance-based value approach. Since it is after 
the negotiation phase that the final contract is written, this phase becomes crucial as it involves a 
lot of decision-making. This thesis thus bases its focus on this particular phase, and provides a 
mathematical foundation to negotiations by using the theory of bargaining, which forms a 
significant part of game theory.! ! !
Systems Engineering 
The design of LSCES is traditionally done using the conventional Systems Engineering 
approach that evolved as a discipline during the latter half of the 20th century in order to tackle the 
problems associated with the design of large scale systems with ever-increasing complexity. This 
approach is based on requirements that are formed at the highest level in the organization [12, 47-
49], and the organizations are generally decomposed in to hierarchies, which may either be 
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component-based or discipline-based. An example of such a component-based hierarchical 
decomposition is the aircraft system that has been designed as a test case for this paper, depicted 
in Fig. 1. Systems engineering design practices are based on the V-model shown in Fig. 3 [47]. 
This model shows the steps associated with the development lifecycle of systems. The left arm of 
the V-model represents the ‘Definition, Decomposition and Allocation’ phase where the 
requirements are first identified at the top level based on customer needs. These requirements are 
then broken down and communicated to the subsystem level design teams, which further break 
down the requirements for the component level design teams. Once each design team has designed 
their respective subsystems occurs the ‘Integration, Verification and Validation’ phase represented 
by the right arm of the V-model. In this, the system is integrated and iterations are performed in 
case the final system is not consistent with stakeholder requirements. This approach however does 
not distinguish between designs, and does not consider if a!potential design may be better than 
other designs. In short, any design that satisfies the stakeholder requirements is accepted as the 
final design.  
! !
Figure 3. Systems Engineering V-model!
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The SE approach limits exploration of the design space due to the imposition of 
requirements, which serve as true proxies for the true preferences of the stakeholders. This 
approach does not consider the possibility that the best design may lie outside the design space 
bounded by requirements. For example, when a requirement on total cost of a system is put forth, 
the SE methodology leaves no possibility for a design to be selected that may cost more but also 
yield a much greater profit, which is what is actually desired by the stakeholders. It also doesn’t 
consider optimization of the design within the feasible design space. Also, the physical interactions 
that exist in such large scale systems cannot be captured accurately using Interface Control 
Documents that are used in the SE process [12, 47-49]. The lack of a rigorous mathematical model 
to represent the couplings results in a system that is inconsistent in physics. 
 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization 
MDO emerged as a field of optimization from structural 
optimization in the early 1980’s [50, 51]. It addresses the 
couplings inherently present within the system such that the 
system consistency is obtained. The capturing of the 
interactions within the subsystems through couplings results in 
a system that is consistent in physics, an issue not addressed in 
the SE approach [12, 47-49]. Traditional MDO involves a 
design space representing the objective function that is to be 
optimized, and this design space is bound by the constraints that 
are levied on the objective function. Constraints essentially 
represent the requirements observed in traditional SE practices. However, it should be noted that 
!
Figure 4. Multidisciplinary Design 
Feasible (MDF)!Framework!
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MDO does not provide a means for creating an objective function but merely assumes that one 
already exists.  
MDO provides for the capturing of couplings or behavior variables during both analysis 
and optimization through frameworks such as the Multidisciplinary Design Feasible (MDF) shown 
in Fig. 4 [14, 52]. The framework depicts how design variables denoted by X are initialized by the 
optimizer and fed into the system analysis block that performs iterations till convergence is 
obtained to determine a set of outputs. These outputs are then fed into the optimizer that performs 
optimization on the objective function using these outputs to determine a new set of design 
variables, which are again fed in to the analysis block. This process continues till convergence is 
obtained and the system is consistent at all levels for the final set of design variables. In the figure 
shown, three coupled subsystems (SS1, SS2 and SS3) have been considered. The variable ‘y’ 
represents the behavior variables that act as inputs and outputs between the subsystems. MDO is 
used to distinguish the best design from a wide range of design alternatives within the feasible 
design space. However, as the constraint-bound objective function merely serves as a surrogate 
for the true preferences of the stakeholder, MDO is used with a value function in this research to 
evaluate the optimal aircraft designs for both the government and the commercial organization.  
 
Value-Driven Design 
A new SE approach called Value-Driven Design (VDD) has been proposed recently that 
captures the true preferences of the stakeholders by means of a single function called Value 
Function [13, 53]. VDD minimizes the number of requirements placed on the system thereby 
offering better exploration of the design space so as to achieve an optimal design. Design 
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optimization in the context of VDD is represented by Fig. 5 that shows the life cycle development 
of systems.   
Value functions are functions of attributes 
which represent the characteristics of the system. These 
attributes in turn are function of design variables, or 
inputs given to the system that are altered to change the 
design of the system. VDD aims at minimizing 
constraints thereby enabling better exploration of the 
design space. The value function has a singular unit 
(usually monetary) that reflects the true preference of 
the stakeholder and allows for direct comparison between competing designs that have the same 
set of design attributes. The value function is formed such that it is consistent at all levels, with 
higher level attributes being functions of lower level attributes and design variables, and such that 
it captures tradeoffs with the help of a mathematical relationship. The decomposition of the value 
function to the lowest levels enables improved consistency in decision-making as decision-makers 
at all levels are designing for a single objective that is desired by the stakeholder at the topmost 
level [54]. 
 
Theory of Bargaining 
Bargaining forms an extensive part of game theory and also incorporates principles of 
cooperative decision making [55]. In the economic model of bargaining, players try to divide a 
resource between each other by taking turns at making offers. Each player tries to have the largest 
share of the resource for himself. An offer made by the first player can either be accepted or 
!
Figure 5.!Value-Driven Design Process!
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rejected by the other player. If the offer is accepted, the game ends and the players divide the 
resource as per the offer made by player 1. If player 2 rejects the offer, he gets to make a counter 
offer, which in turn, can be either accepted or rejected by player 1. This process continues till one 
of the parties accepts an offer. A game of bargaining can theoretically have an infinite number of 
rounds; in practice however, it cannot be played indefinitely. Each player has a time discount factor ! that represents his impatience towards the game, where ! lies between 0 and 1, 0 representing a 
completely impatient and 1 a very patient player, respectively. After each round, the value of the 
system is reduced by a factor of !. The greater the player patience, the better is the payoff received 
by the player. The subgame perfect equilibria for such a two-player bargaining game are shown, 
where "∗$and$(∗ are the outcomes proposed by players 1 and 2, respectively, when each of them 
leads. The equilibria strategies and equilibria conditions are shown in Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively 
[56, 57]. 
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The following chapter describes elaborately the aircraft model that will be used as a test 
bed for this research.  
 
 
!
23 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
AIRCRAFT MODEL 
A high-level bomber aircraft model has been developed to use as a case study for this 
research [58-61]. The purpose of this aircraft is assumed to be the transportation of ammunition 
and personnel from one location to another. It should be noted that the model created for this study 
is approximate and based on past data and knowledge with some educated assumptions. 
The mission profile selected to fulfill this purpose has been shown in Fig. 6. It is comprised 
of 4 mission segments, namely taxi, takeoff and climb, cruise before payload drop, cruise after 
payload drop (return segment) and the descent and land. 
The contractor’s organization is assumed to be broken down hierarchically.!It consists of 
teams that have been divided according to the main components of the aircraft, namely the wing, 
fuselage, tail, engine and landing gear. These form the first subsystem level. The wing and fuselage 
subsystems have been divided into further subsystems spanning one level down the hierarchy. The 
components for the second level for the wing are the spars, ribs and the skin whereas for the 
fuselage they are the frames, the longerons and the skin. Figure 7 depicts the hierarchical 
breakdown discussed above. Each of the individual subsystems of the aircraft and the associated 
equations for their analysis are described in Appendix A. 
!
Figure 6.!Mission Profile for Aircraft!
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  Since this is a high level model, only three disciplines and their corresponding interactions 
were considered in this research, namely structures, aerodynamics and performance. The three 
disciplines and the couplings between them has been represented by the Design Structure Matrix 
(DSM) shown in Fig. 8. Design variables are independent variables that are input externally. These 
define the design. The aircraft system considered in this research is comprised of 18 design 
variables out of which 14 are discrete and integers and the rest are continuous. Table 1 lists these 
design variables and their corresponding descriptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Description of Design Variables 
Design variable Description 
Masspayload Mass of payload in kg 
Typewing Type of wing 
!
Figure 8.!Discipline-based DSM for Aircraft Model!
!
Figure 7.!Hierarchical Decomposition of Aircraft Model!
!
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lfuselage Length of the fuselage in m 
Typetail Type of tail 
Materialtail Material of tail 
Typelandinggear Type of landing gear 
neng Number of engines 
Typeeng Type of engine 
Materialspar Material of spar 
lwing Length of the wing in m 
lchord Length of the chord in m 
Materialrib Material of rib 
Materialskin,wing Material of skin of wings 
nframes Number of frames 
Materialframe Material of frames 
Materiallongeron Material of longerons 
nlongerons Number of longerons 
Materialskin,fuselage Material of fuselage 
 
Table 2 provides a list of the behavior variables of the aircraft system and their descriptions. 
Behavior variables are the outputs of the disciplinary analysis that represent the behavior of the 
system, whereas attributes are the outputs that characterize the subsystems. 
Table 2. Description of Behavior Variables 
Behavior variable Description 
Mwing Mass of the wing in kg 
Mfuselage Mass of the fuselage in kg 
Mtail Mass of the tail in kg 
Mlndgear Mass of the landing gear in kg 
Table 1 continued 
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Mengine Mass of the engines in kg 
Mfuel Mass of the fuel in kg 
Range Total range in km 
Vcruise Cruise velocity in m/s 
Mspar Mass of spars in kg 
Mribs Mass of the ribs in kg 
Mframes Mass of the frames in kg 
Mlongerons Mass of the longerons in kg 
Mskin Mass of the skin in kg 
 
Table A in Appendix A gives a detailed list of the attributes and behavior variables at each 
subsystem level and the design variables associated with each. The profit obtained by the company 
is the difference between the revenue generated by selling these aircraft and the cost to the 
company for manufacturing the aircraft. The total cost is assumed to be the sum of the costs of the 
individual systems and is given by Eq. (3). The revenue generated by the company is the product 
of the number of aircraft sold and the price of each aircraft, given by Eq. (4). The number of aircraft 
sold, in turn, is a function of the range, cruise velocity, stealth, and also the price per aircraft. The 
problem created follows the traditional design cycle shown in Fig. 1.  
)*+,-.-/0 = )*+,2345 + )*+,789:0/5: + )*+,-/30 + )*+,0/4;3455:/< + )*+,:4534: ∗$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$=/3<></7-?@AB$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(3)!CDEDFGD = HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, ∗ =/3<></7-?@AB$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(4)!
!
A set of design variables is initiated that feeds into the subsystems to define the physics. 
An analysis is then carried out to achieve system consistency and the output of this analysis are 
the attributes that feed into the value function to give the value associated with that set of attributes. 
Table 2 continued 
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An optimization is then carried out to determine a new set of design variables that again feed into 
the subsystems, and the process repeats. This cycle goes on till a final optimum value is found, 
that corresponds to the maximum profit in the aircraft example considered in this research. Both 
the analysis and optimization performed for the aircraft model are multidisciplinary, in order to 
correctly capture all the subsystem interactions and disciplinary couplings for a consistent system 
[62]. Genetic Algorithm is used in this research as the method for optimization to account for the 
presence of discrete design variable choices [63]. 
The different value functions that can be used as per the preferences of the government and 
the contractor are described in the next chapter as are the details of the value functions used in this 
study.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
28 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
VALUE FUNCTIONS 
The focus of this chapter is to discuss in detail the various value functions that can be used 
by the DoD and the contractor in different cases as per their preferences and also describes the 
values functions used particularly in this thesis for both the parties. 
 
Value Functions for Company 
It is considered that the contractor for designing the bomber aircraft desired for defense 
purposes by the government has been selected from amongst one of the many commercial 
companies bidding for the contract, and a negotiation is to take place between the contractor and 
the DoD before writing the final proposal. The primary preference of the contractor is to maximize 
the profit he can obtain by designing an aircraft that is consistent with the preferences of the 
government, at the same time ensuring that he himself isn’t losing money. In this case, the value 
function used by the company should be one that correctly captures their true preference of 
maximization of profit for the organization. This value function yields a single dollar value that 
reflects the profit made by the company. The value function that can be used for such profit-
seeking organizations is usually profit, which is the difference between the revenue generated by 
the company and the cost incurred by them in developing the system, as shown in Eq. (5) [64]. 
Here, O3,Q represents the profit for a single company where C3,Q$is the company’s revenue and )3,Qis 
their cost. The indices "J" and "S" represent the company and the time period (e.g. a fiscal year), 
respectively. 
O3,Q$ = C3,Q$ − )3,Q$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$                     (5)!
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A more practical modification of the profit value function is the Net Present Profit (NPP) 
metric, that accounts for the passage of time with respect to accumulation of profits as well as the 
discount associated with the net worth of future money. The NPP is given by Eq. (6). In this case, "I" represents the discount rate. A variation of the NPP represented in Eq. (6) is given by Eq. (7) 
[65]. This equation more specifically applies to LSCES and accounts for the profit obtained in the 
initial period (e.g. during the acquisition period) which is represented by O3,U. This is simply the 
initial profit, and the profit during the later periods is represented by O3,Q. The variable "," 
represents the number of future periods that are to be accounted for. 
=HH3 = VW,XYZ< X-Q[U $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(6)!=HH3 = O3,U + Y< 1 − 1 + I ]- O3,Q !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(7)!
!
In this research, for simplicity of demonstration and understanding, the simple profit value 
function given by Eq. (5) is used. Specific descriptions of the profit value function are given in 
further chapters in the context to which the value function is used in each case. The other value 
functions will be considered in future work. 
 
Value Functions for Government 
The prime desire of the government is to have a system that offers the maximum probability 
of operational success. These systems are unique because there exists no defined market for such 
systems, and unlike other systems used for commercial gains, these systems do not generate any 
revenue for the government. These systems are mainly used for defense and research for 
technology improvement, among others. Thus, the value functions associated with such systems 
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reflect the operational characteristics of the system rather than their monetary value. An example 
of such an operational value function is the probability of operational success, L(_`) given by Eq. 
(8), that represents the success achieved from the operation when F number of systems are used 
involved in the operation. The operation succeeds only when each individual system succeeds L(_ 3`), and this success is independent of the success of the other systems. This probability of 
success of the operation is represented in terms of probability of operational failure, L(_b), which 
represents the failure of the operation only if each individual system’s operation L _b3  fails, when F systems are considered [66]. Thus, 
L _b = L _b3 4!1 − L _` = 1 − L _`3 4!L _` = 1 − 1 − L _`3 4$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(8)!
The probability of operational success of an individual system is a function of the 
survivability and the effectiveness of the system, as has been established in past work [67]. The 
probability of survivability L(`) is a measure of how survivable the aircraft is so that it can operate 
or perform its intended operations in hazardous environments. It is the probability that the aircraft 
will not be shot down during operation. Measures such as stealth technologies as well as control 
system redundancies are used to improve the probability of survivability of the aircraft. For the 
aircraft example used in this research, the survivability is taken to be a function of the velocity at 
which the aircraft can cruise and the stealthiness of the aircraft. The probability of effectiveness L(c/b) is the chance that the system can successfully completes the operation, given that it already 
survives it. The effectiveness of the bomber aircraft considered in this case is considered to be a 
function of the amount of payload it can deliver and the range over which it can deliver the payload. 
The probability of operational success of a single aircraft is given by Eq. (9).   
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L _`3 = L ` ∩ c = L ` . L(c/`)$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(9) 
!
Cost per success 
Although the primary desire of the government is to achieve the maximum probability of 
operational success for their system, there is only some defined amount up to which the 
government can spend on the system. The costs incurred for performing the desired operations 
cannot be overlooked. Thus, metrics have been developed to account for these costs along with 
the operational attributes. One such metric used traditionally is the ‘cost-per-operation’ ()H_), 
which is the ratio of the total cost to the buyer or the price paid to the contractor per aircraft H/3<></7- (assuming no other additional cost is incurred) and the number of operations, +, expected 
to be performed by the system over the course of its lifetime. The number of operations take into 
account the discount factor I to amount for the reduction in value due to the passage of time, the 
number of operations, g, performed by the system in a campaign, and (, the mean number of 
years between campaigns. + is given by Eq. (10) and the )H_ is given by Eq. (11). 
+ = h iY]h i Y] h i jY] h i j Y]< k $$$$$$$$$$$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(10)!)H_ = lmWnonmpq9 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(11) 
A modified version of the )H_ metric discussed above is the ‘cost-per-kill’ or the ‘cost-
per-success’ ()H`), as it is generally described. This modified equation accounts for the 
operational costs along with the operational success of the system, which is the true preference of 
the stakeholder. It is the ratio of the cost-per-operation of a single system and the negative natural 
log of the probability of operational failure of that system. This accounts for the total number of 
attempts made by the system. The stakeholder using this metric aims to obtain a final system design 
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that minimizes the cost-per-success. In short, the stakeholder aims to pay minimal price per aircraft 
and at the same time have the maximum operational success. The )H` is described by Eq. (12) 
[66]. 
)H` = rls] tu Y]h siW $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(12)!
!
For this research, the probability of operational success described by Eq. 9 is used as the 
value function in order to examine the effects of not considering price as a part of the negotiations. 
The findings from this implication are described in detail in a later chapter. However, the use of 
cost or price-dependent value functions will definitely form an important part of future work for 
this research. 
The next two chapters in this thesis will address the two research questions in particular 
and the results from the implementation of the proposed ideas will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7. 
!
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CHAPTER 6 
NEGOTIATIONS IN A COMBINED PRICE AND PERFORMANCE-BASED VALUE 
CONTRACTING SCENARIO 
The focus of this research is the enhancement of the negotiations stage that occurs in typical 
defense acquisition programs in a bid to improve the design of the system and the value to both 
the government and the contractor. The first research questions aims to combine the traditional 
priced-based and performance-based contract structures and to use a value outlook to assess the 
final system design, the value to the contractor (profit) and the value to the government (an 
assumed measure of benefit for accepting an offer or rejecting it). The framework from the 
negotiation is based on the bargain model described above.  
In the case where the three types of contracting have been combined, it is assumed that the 
government sets down a certain operational requirement that must be met by the aircraft system 
designed by the company and does not concern itself with the processes followed by the contractor 
as long as the requirement is met. They however, conduct an extensive market survey to determine 
the approximate price for the system under consideration. The survey could be based on prices of 
similar systems that may have existed in the past, or existing current technology, or talking to the 
experts in the field; and is totally dependent on the existing market for the system. The contractor 
on the other hand, on receiving the operational requirement from the government, does its own 
cost analysis to determine the price they will be putting out to the government. In order to achieve 
this, the company tries to come up with a design that maximizes their profit, which is indeed their 
true preference, at the same time making sure that the government’s operational is satisfied, even 
if minimally. Based on the cost obtained for the system (optimal) that maximizes their profit, the 
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company establishes a price for the system that they intend on proposing to the government. This 
price is decided on the basis of a return rate that the company expects on their investment [68].  
For the aircraft test case, it is assumed that the government desires that the aircraft be at 
least 72% successful in its operations, i.e. they wish that their probability of operational success 
from the mission, given by Eq. (13) be 0.72. The value was chosen arbitrarily to represent an 
aircraft which is fairly successful, so that no extreme was considered. However, this value can 
always be changed to reflect the government’s desire and to see the effect of the changed value on 
the cost of the system. 
Thus, L _ 3` ≥ 0.72$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(13) 
This is passed on as a requirement to the contractor to incorporate in his design. In this 
case, the price is decided based on the total cost to the contractor and the investment that he expects 
on his investment. The profit thus, is taken to be a percentage of the total cost, which is the nothing 
but the sum of the costs of the individual subsystems as given by Eq. 3. Normally, the government 
offers a 15% return on investment for experimental, developmental, or research projects, but to 
obtain a wider margin for negotiation, we consider return rates between 10-20% [69]. The price or 
the revenue is then the sum of the cost and the profit, according to Eq. 5. In order to determine the 
price to be quoted, the contractor does an analysis for a design in which his aim is to maximize is 
profit. This is done by means of using MDO, in which the objective function is the profit given as 
a function of the cost and the return rate denoted by r, as discussed above, and the government’s 
requirement is set as a constraint. In this form of contracting, we assume that the number of systems 
desired is pre-decided and is taken to be 100 in this example. Thus, the formal optimization 
statement for the contractor is given by Eq. (14) 
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NJFz${ = {;39><-:${34-:5:<9$|2345$|>}.<;$|789:0/5:$~M++h/0./; $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(14) ~JF$N { = −HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, = − I ∗ )*+,$LDI$MJIKIMN,  +. ,$ÄY:$0.72 − L _ 3` ≤ 0 
For simplicity, the profit achieved due to a single aircraft is calculated and then the total 
profit attained by the contractor is simply the multiplication of the profit per aircraft and the 
number of aircraft sold, which in this case is 100. Thus, the total profit to the contractor is given 
by Eq. (15), whereas the price per aircraft to be quoted is given by Eq. (16). 
É*,MÑ$LI*NJ, = HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, ∗ =*. *N$MJIKIMN,$+*Ñz 
Thus, É*,MÑ$LI*NJ, = HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, ∗ 100$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(15) HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, = HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, + )*+,$LDI$MJIKIMN,$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(16) 
The results from the optimization, i.e. the system attributes are given in Table 3. Table 4 
lists the profit to the contractor for different return rates.  
 
 
Table 3. Results from Optimization in Combined Contracting 
Attribute Value 
Range (in km) 17,812 
Mass of payload (in kg) 79,999 
Cruise velocity (in m/s) 510 
 Stealth 0.9 L(_ 3`) 0.72 
!
Table 4. Contractor Profit for Different Return Rates in Combined Contracting 
r Price per 
aircraft ($M) 
Profit per 
aircraft ($M) 
Total Profit 
($B) 
10% 590 53.67 5.36 
15% 616 80.4 8.04 
20% 644 107 10.7 
!
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For the part involving priced-based acquisitions, a negotiation takes place between the two 
entities before writing the final contract. This occurs because the government would want to pay 
the lowest possible price for their desired system, whereas the contractor would want the highest 
possible price for the same 
system in order to maximize his 
profit as given by Eq. (16).   
In this research, we 
propose an addition to the 
operation cum price-based 
contracting, the value to the 
stakeholders. We propose that 
each of the parties evaluate for 
their true preference or value in the bargaining game that ensues between them to decide when to 
accept or reject an offer. In this case, the value to the contractor (denoted by Vc) remains the profit 
they will receive from providing the DoD with its desired system, and is a function of the price, 
given by Eq. (17). The relationship between profit and price is linear in this case as is found from 
running the analysis for different return rates r, and can be seen from the plot in Fig. 9. The value 
to the DoD (denoted by Vg) is taken to be an arbitrary measure of the benefit to them depending 
on the final price paid for the system, i.e. the lower the price, the higher the value. This is described 
by Eq. (18).  
Ö> = HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, = 1.0142 ∗ HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, − 536.709 ∗ 10ã$$$$$$$$$$$$(17) Ö5 = ÖMÑGD$LDI$MJIKIMN, = −0.0205 ∗ HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, + 13.3225 ∗ 10ã$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(18) 
!
Figure 9. Contractor’s Profit as a Function of Price 
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The patience of the DoD in accepting an offer right away holding back till further rounds 
in a bid to reduce the price depends on the urgency with which the system is desired. The urgency 
may refer to times of sudden threats to national security, sudden outbreak or an ongoing war, times 
of peace, etc. In the same way, the patience of the contractor will depend on their perceived 
difference in value from accepting a proposed offer and waiting for the next round to put forth 
their bid. This has been captured by assigning a numerical value to the patience levels of both the 
entities, represented by !, where ! is a number between 0 and 1. The value of the commodity 
decreases by a factor of ! with every round, and is used as a decision guideline by the players to 
wait for another round in the game of bargaining or accept the offer right away. The patience level 
increases as ! goes from 0 to 1. A value of ! = 1 represents a very patient player whereas ! = 0 
represents a completely impatient player [70]. In this part of the research, a game of sequential 
bargaining is considered, where players take turns at making offers, and the game continues till an 
offer is accepted. A case of random bargaining, where there is no particular order in which players 
propose, is discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
In this bargaining game, it is assumed that each of the respective players have a threshold 
price below or above which they will not accept an offer. In case of the DoD, it decides on a 
maximum price that it will be willing to offer for the system, based on its market research, and 
will never go above that price. In case of the contractor, they set a minimum price that they would 
be willing to accept for designing the system for the DoD. If the price offered to them goes below 
this price, it would be beneficial for them to simply quit the contracting process. The negotiation 
begins with one player offering a price. In this case, the government would start with the lowest 
reasonable price possible, whereas on the other hand, the contractor would start with the price they 
think would fetch them the highest profit, if they were to begin. The threshold and the starting 
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prices for the bargain model constructed for this research for both the government and the 
contractor are given in Table 5.  
Once an offer has been made, the offeree uses the price offered by the offeror to evaluate 
his payoff, in this case the value. He then uses this value to ascertain if his equilibrium condition, 
given by Eq. (2) has been met. If the offeree believes that the price being offered to him in the 
current round cannot yield him a better value than that he would receive by waiting for the next 
round to make an offer, he rejects the offer. After each round, the value to either of the parties 
decreases by a factor of their respective patience levels. If an offer is rejected by a player, the 
offeree in the previous round becomes the new offeror in the current round, and the previous 
offeror alters his offering price to be offered in the next round, did the game continue further. In 
case of the government, if a price proposed by them is rejected by the contractor in the current 
round, they increase their price to be offered in the next round, were the game to continue to further 
rounds. In the same way, the company would reduce their price. In this study, the prices were 
changed by 1% after every round. The negotiation continues to and fro till an offer is accepted, 
and the game ends. The bargain model in this study is tested for varying patient levels of both the 
players, and the results obtained are given in the Table 6. !5 and !> represent the patience factors 
of the government and contractor, respectively. For this case, it is assumed that the government 
Table 5. Threshold Prices for Government and Contractor in 
Combined Contracting 
 Threshold price ($M) Starting offer ($M) 
Government 645 601 
Contractor 590 644 
!
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makes the first offer, and the implicit advantages of beginning the bargain are shown in a sub test 
case later in this chapter. 
From the above table, it can be seen that when the contractor is extremely patient (0.95) 
and the government has very low patience (0.1), the game ends in the second round because the 
government accepts the offer right away. The value received by the government is thus very low 
on the arbitrary scale. The contractor, on the other hand, receives the highest value because the 
government accepts his first proposed offer itself, thus yearning the contractor the highest possible 
profit. As the contractor’s patience reduces (0.9) and the government’s increases (0.2) the 
government still accepts the offer, but the game goes on for a longer period and ends only after 4 
rounds. The government’s value improves due to the greater patience, but is still comparatively 
low. The contractor’s profit on the other hand, drops by about $3 billion. In the case where the 
government is extremely patient (0.9), as in periods of global peace, when there is no urgent need 
Table 6. Result of the Game Using Combined Contracting 
Patience 
factors (å) Rounds Offer accepted Final price per 
aircraft ($M) 
çé (∗ èêë) çí ($B) (Profit from 100 aircraft) åé åí Govt Comp 
0.1 0.95 2 ! × 644.05 119 11.06 
0.2 0.9 4 ! × 637.61 251 8.84 
0.9 0.1 1 × ! 601.11 999 7.29 
0.3 0.8 3 × ! 607.12 262 7.90 
0.5 0.5 1 × ! 601.11 999 7.29 
0.6 0.7 3 × ! 607.12 525 7.90 
0.98 0.98 8 ! × 624.92 511 9.31 
!
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for the system, and when the contractor is quite impatient (0.1), the contractor accepts the first 
offer and the game ends in the first round itself as the government begins the game. This yields 
the contractor quite a low profit of $7.29 billion, which is about a $4 billion lower than his highest 
attainable value. When both the players have a very high patience (0.98), the game goes on for a 
longer period, as intuition suggests, because neither of the players are willing to give up. In this 
case, the game ends after 8 rounds with the government finally accepting the company’s offer. 
Even though the game goes on for a longer period, the value of the system to the players reduces 
by only 2% after each round, which does not result in a great reduction in the final values to the 
players, as can be seen from the table.  
An interesting observation made in this model however, is that even though theory says 
that the patience factor should dictate players’ decision to accept or reject an offer, the sensitivity 
of the players’ value or payoff plays an important role, as can be seen from the obtained results. 
In this test case, the contractor’s profit is extremely sensitive to price, and because he is only 
negotiating for prices offering return rates between 10% and 20%, his value drops or increases 
quite suddenly with price, causing him to accept the offer even when his patience is relatively high 
(0.8) as compared to the government’s (0.3). The same holds true even when the contractor’s 
patience changes to 0.7, and the government’s increases to 0.6, and both the values result in the 
contractor accepting the offer in the third round yielding him the same profit. The government’s 
earned value, however, varies in the two cases as their value changes by a different factor for either 
case. These observations can be seen clearly in Table 6. When both the players have a patience 
factor of 0.5, the contractor ends up accepting the offer in the first round itself due to the same 
reason as above. 
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The results obtained from this combined form of contracting are compared to a traditional 
form of acquisition, where the government puts forth a requirement for the desired system to be 
the most cost-effective. This is a traditional requirement that plays proxy to the true preference of 
both the stakeholders as the government wishes for maximum mission success whereas the 
contractor desires maximum monetary gains for his organization. This requirement is 
communicated to the highest level in the organization of the company, for example, the CEO. The 
requirement of minimum cost is then passed down the hierarchy of the organization in order for 
the designers to come up with a design and the cost estimate. The lower level teams break down 
the requirements and form their own requirements in order for the design to be feasible. The 
company then tries to come up with a design that minimizes cost and satisfies the other design 
requirements as well, which intuitively translates into an optimization problem, with the objective 
being minimum cost. For this study, it is assumed that the government puts out a requirement for 
an aircraft weapon system with minimum cost that also: 
•! Weighs less than 150,000 kg 
•! Flies a range of at least 9000 km 
The design teams analyze these requirements and based on these, create their own requirements. 
The formal optimization statement for this test case is given by Eq. (19), where i represents the 
total number of subsystems. 
NJFz${ = {;39><-:${34-:5:<9$|2345$|>}.<;$|789:0/5:$~M++h/0./; $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(19) 
~JF$N { = É*,MÑ$K*+,$LDI$MJIKIMN, = )*+,3ì3[Y  +. ,$ÄY:$~M++-.-/0 − 150000$îÄ ≤ 0 Äï: 9000$îg − CMFÄD ≤ 0$ 
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Äñ: 165$g/+ − Ö><839: ≤ 0 8$g ≤ |2345 ≤ 12$g 2$g ≤ |>}.<; ≤ 4$g 12$g ≤ |789:0/5: ≤ 20$g 15000$îÄ ≤ ~M++h/0./; ≤ 50000$îÄ 
It is assumed that the requirement on the velocity and the 4 side bounds were imposed by 
the design team of the contractor to ensure a meaningful design. The attributes from the obtained 
final system and the corresponding probability of operational success for this system are given in 
Table 7. All the constraints were satisfied. The price per aircraft for such a system that minimizes 
cost and the corresponding profit to the contractor for selling 100 aircraft with three different return 
rates r are shown in Table 8. 
As can be seen from the above tables, the probability of mission success achieved by using 
the traditional requirements-driven approach is around 40%, whereas that obtained from the 
previous value-based approach was 72%. Also, all the operational attributes from this approach 
Table 7. Results from Optimization Using CBA 
Attribute Value 
Range (in km) 9001 
Mass of payload (in kg) 49,999 
Cruise velocity (in m/s) 257 
 Stealth 0.5 L(_ 3`) 0.402 
!
Table 8. Contractor Profit for Different Return Rates Using CBA  
r Price per 
aircraft ($M) 
Profit per 
aircraft ($M) 
Total Profit 
($M) 
10% 29 2.64 264 
15% 30 3.96 396 
20% 31 5.28 528 
!
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are much lower in value compared to the combined contracting process. The profit that can be 
obtained by the contractor from this system, even with a 20% rate of return is still 3 orders lower 
in magnitude than the lowest possible profit that he can get by using the previous approach. In any 
case, even after negotiating and based on the patience levels of both the players, the final payoff 
to both the players will be lesser than that obtained by using the combined performance, price and 
value based approach to contracting. In this traditional cost-based acquisition process, once the 
cost analysis is completed by the company, a detailed report about the cost breakdown is provided 
to the DoD by the contractor, and a bargain ensues between the two parties in a bid to maximize 
their respective payoffs. Here, there is no need for the government to conduct a market survey as 
an exact dollar amount is provided to them by the company. The payoff to the company or their 
profit in this game of bargaining is denoted by Pc whereas they payoff to the government, again an 
arbitrary measure of benefit as a function of the price paid is denoted by Pg. The equations for the 
payoffs to either of the players are denoted as Eq. (20) and Eq. (21), respectively. Again, the payoff 
equation for the government has a negative slope because the lower the price, the higher their 
payoff or benefit.  
H> = HI*NJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, = HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, − 26.41 ∗ 10ã$$$$$$$$$$                    (20) H5 = òDFDNJ,$LDI$MJIKIMN, = −3.406 ∗ HIJKD$LDI$MJIKIMN, + 10.8961 ∗ 10ã$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(21) 
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The same theory behind threshold prices for both the players described above applies to 
this case as well, and the values of the threshold and starting prices for the DoD and the contractor 
are given in Table 9 
The same logic about the equilibrium conditions from above applies to this game. The 
results for different patience levels of the players are given in Table 10 and is followed by an 
interpretation of the obtained results. 
 
Patience 
factors (å) Rounds Offer accepted Final price per 
aircraft ($M) 
ôé (∗ èêë) ôí ($M) (Profit from 100 aircraft) åé åí Govt Comp 
0.1 0.95 2 ! × 31.690 100 528.70 
0.2 0.9 4 ! × 31.380 208 447.30 
0.9 0.1 1 × ! 29.500 848 309.00 
0.3 0.8 3 × ! 29.790 224 338.50 
0.5 0.5 1 × ! 29.500 848 309.00 
0.6 0.7 3 × ! 29.795 448 399.72 
0.98 0.98 9 × ! 30.697 421 428.78 
 
Table 9. Threshold Prices for Government and Contractor Using CBA 
 Threshold price ($M) Starting offer ($M) 
Government 32.00 29.50 
Contractor 29.05 31.69 
!
Table 10. Result of the Game Using CBA 
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The results obtained from the cost-based acquisitions follow a similar trend with regards 
to the patience levels of the players as in the previous case, however, in this case also, the 
sensitivities of the player payoffs have an effect on the final result, as cab be clearly seen from 
Table 10 above.  
The important point to be considered from this study is the notable difference in the 
obtained results when different forms of contracting are used. Table 11 gives a side by side 
comparison of the final system attributes and the prices after negotiations using the traditional 
CBA and the proposed new combined method of contracting. 
As can be seen from the above table, the system obtained from the proposed combined 
form of contracting has a much more superior design as compared to the one obtained from the 
traditional process. Similarly, the new form of contracting yields much better payoffs to both the 
government and the contractor, which is what they truly desire of any system being designed. 
This concludes the proof to the first research question.  
 
Table 11. Comparison of CBA and Combined Acquisitions 
 Cost-based acquisitions Combined acquisitions 
Range (in km) 9001 17,812 
Mass of payload (in kg) 49,999 79,999 
Cruise velocity (in m/s) 257 510 
 Stealth 0.5 0.9 ö(õúù) 0.402 0.72 
Total profit for lowest 
contractor patience ($) 
309.00 million 7.29 billion 
!
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Task 1: Impact of Beginning the Bargaining Game on Payoffs 
As an additional in this part of the research, the influence of the player making the first 
offer in the negotiation on the final player payoffs is tested. In order to achieve this, for the same 
system and the same final set of attributes as above, a bargaining game is simulated in which the 
contractor is the first player to make an offer, in order to observe how the final payoffs to the 
players are affected. This is done for both the traditional acquisitions and the new combined 
acquisitions processes. The results for the two games along with a side by side comparison with 
the above cases are given in Tables 12 and 13. 
•! Combined contracting 
 
 åé = ê. è åí = ê. ûü åé = ê. û åí = ê. è åé = ê. † åí = ê. ° åé = ê. û¢ åí = ê. û¢ 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Rounds 1 2 2 1 4 3 8 8 
Offer 
accepted 
Govt ! ! × × × × × ! 
Comp × × ! ! ! ! ! × 
Price per aircraft 
($M) 
644.05 644.05 601.11 601.11 607.12 607.12 619.32 624.92 
Pg (*103) 119 119 899 999 285 525 599 511 
Pc ($M) 11640 11060 7290 7290 7900 7900 9140 9310 
 
 
 
Table 12. Result of Reversed Order Game Using Combined Contracting 
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•! Cost based contracting 
 
 åé = ê. è åí = ê. ûü åé = ê. û åí = ê. è åé = ê. † åí = ê. ° åé = ê. û¢ åí = ê. û¢ 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Player 
1=Comp 
Player 
1=Govt 
Rounds 1 2 2 1 4 3 8 9 
Offer 
accepted 
Govt ! ! × × × × × × 
Comp × × ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Price per aircraft 
($M) 
31.69 31.69 29.50 29.50 29.79 29.79 30.39 30.69 
Pg (*103) 100 100 763 848 245 448 520 421 
Pc ($M) 528.70 502.26 309.00 309.00 338.50 338.50 398.38 428.78 
 
From the two test cases above, it can be seen that making the first offer definitely yields a 
better payoff to the proposer if the offer is accepted by the other player and not himself. For 
example, in the two examples given above, when !> = 0.95 and !5 = 0.1, the government accepts 
the offer in both cases. However, the profit or payoff to the company is greater when they make 
the first offer, as can be seen. In the same way, when !> = 0.1 and !5 = 0.95, the company accepts 
the offer in both the test cases. In either case, the payoff received by the government is greater 
when they are the first player. The boxes highlighted in yellow indicate which player is at an 
advantage. The observations made above are quite intuitive, because if the accepting player makes 
the first offer, then the other player has to wait for another round before his offer is accepted, which 
amounts to a reduction in the value of the system by a factor of !. Making the first offer averts this 
loss because the game ends in one lesser round, thereby giving the player a higher payoff. 
Table 13. Result of Reversed Order Game Using CBA 
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However, in the case where both the players are extremely patient, it can be observed that the 
player making the first offer always receives the better payoff, irrespective of which player finally 
accepts the offer, as can be seen from both the test cases when ! for both the players is 0.98, which 
suggests that in an infinitely long game (almost), the player making the first offer always stands at 
an advantage. 
With this, research question 1 as well as the additional study on player order have been 
completed. The next chapter will address the second research question and state the findings from 
the implication of the proposition. 
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CHAPTER 7 
NEGOTIATION OVER ATTRIBUTES USING VDD 
 Where the conventional method is to bargain over the price of a system, in this 
research, we consider a new approach to the method of bargaining, that over the attributes of the 
system. This approach has been proposed in a previous study but according to the author’s 
knowledge, no detailed work has been carried out on the topic so far [70]. It focuses to investigate 
if the direct bargaining over the system attributes would enable bridging the gap between the 
stakeholder preferences, and thereby lead to a better design of the final system. The common 
attributes that affect the values of both the government and the company are identified for the 
aircraft example and a bargain model is set up which is described in detail later in this section. 
In this case, it is assumed that both the players are only concerned with their value, i.e. the 
DoD is not concerned with the budget. They desire a system that gives the maximum operational 
success. The contractor on the other hand, wishes for a system that maximizes his profit. As a 
result of these different preferences, there exists a value gap, which needs to be filled. This is where 
bargaining over attributes comes into picture. The common attributes affecting the values of both 
the players are identified, and the optimal values of these attributes (that maximize value) are 
calculated for each of the players. A negotiation then follows over these values, until an agreement 
point is reached and an offer is accepted, resulting in a design somewhere in between the optimal 
designs of both the players. A description of this bargain model and the optimal values to the 
players are given in the following section. 
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Bargain Model 
The new method of bargaining is introduced in this research in a bid to achieve a better 
system design by capturing the attributes that reflect the true preferences of the stakeholders. In 
order to enable this, the common attributes that affect the values of both the government and the 
company are identified. In the case of the aircraft example considered in this research, there are 4 
common attributes that impact the profit as well as the probability of operational success, namely 
Range, Mass of payload, Cruise Velocity, and Stealth. In order to test the effectiveness of the 
bargain model, it is first applied to an example problem before proceeding to apply it to the aircraft 
model. A simple system is designed which is hierarchically decomposed into two tiers for one 
party (assuming the company in this case), whereas for the other party it is just one level (assuming 
the government) which are shown in Fig. 10. It is assumed that the value functions of both the 
stakeholders are functions of three common attributes, £Y, £ïand$£ñ. The value functions for the 
government and the contractor, denoted by Ö5and$Ö> are represented by Eq. (22) and Eq. (23), 
where £5represents the attribute set desired by the government and £> represents the attribute set 
desired by the company. £5Y, £>Y, £5ï, £>ï, etc. correspond to the values of the attributes £Y, £ï$and$£ñ desired by the government and the company, respectively. It is also assumed that 
the values of all three attributes lie between 0 and 10. 
Ö5 = N £Y, £ï, £ñ = £5Y£5ï − 2£5ñ − £5ïï $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(22)!Ö> = N £Y, £ï, £ñ = £>Yï − £>ïï + 3£>ñ$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(23)!
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In this case, a sequential bargain game of infinite horizon is considered. It was assumed 
that the government initiates the bargaining, hence they are player 1 and the company is player 2. 
From intuition, it is clear that both the respective players’ preferred attribute set for the design 
would be one that maximizes their individual values, i.e. their optimal set of 
attributes(£5∗ $MFz$£>∗). Thus, in the first round, player 1 always proposes £5∗ . Like player 1, player 
2 also desires his optimal set £>∗  to be the final attribute set. Thus, when £5∗  is proposed, player 2 
accepts the offer only if he believes that his value from £5∗  is greater than the value he would obtain 
by rejecting the offer and proposing his own attribute set £>∗  in the next period, discounted by a 
factor !>. If this equilibrium condition is met, player 2 accepts the offer, the game ends and £5∗  is 
the final attribute set to be used for design. However, if this is found to be not true, player 2 will 
reject the offer and the game will move to round 2. In this round, player 2 will propose £>∗  and 
player 1 will check for his equilibrium, i.e. he will accept £>∗  is greater than the value he would 
receive by waiting for the next round and proposing a new attribute set £54:2, discounted by !5. 
If the condition is satisfied, it puts an end to the game and £>∗  is the final attribute set, if not, the 
game continues in a similar fashion till one player accepts the offer.  
The equilibrium conditions for players 1 and 2, assuming that player 1 makes the first offer, 
are given by Eq. (24) and Eq. (25). Here, ÖY5$and$ÖY> represent player 1’s values due to his own 
 
Figure 10. Hierarchy for Example Problem!
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attribute set and player 2’s attribute set, whereas Öï>$and$Öï5 represent player 2’s values due to 
attribute sets £>and$£5. The deltas in this case represent the discount factors, which in case of the 
company may represent the reduction in value to account for the money to be paid to the 
employees, the inflation in the future periods or the time lost while the negotiation is taking place. 
Thus, the longer the game lasts, the greater is the reduction in value. For the government, the delta 
may represent the losses in research or losses during the time of war associated with the delay in 
the design and manufacture of the aircraft system [71].  
ÖY> ≥ !5 ∗ ÖY5$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(24) Öï5 ≥ !> ∗ Öï>$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(25) 
Optimal Values for Contractor 
As mentioned earlier, the organization of the company in this paper is designed according 
to the 5 major components of the aircraft, and the hierarchy spans two levels. The profit obtained 
by the company is the difference between the revenue generated by selling these aircraft and the 
cost to the company for manufacturing the aircraft. Because the system is being designed for value, 
the number of aircraft sold in this case is not fixed, but depends on the operational attributes. The 
total cost and revenue to the company are the same as given by Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). The number 
of aircraft sold in this case is a function of the range, cruise velocity, stealth, and also the price per 
aircraft.  
The formal optimization statement for determining the optimal attribute set and the optimal 
value for the contractor is given by Eq. (26). 
NJFz${ = {;39><-:${34-:5:<9$|2345$|>}.<;$|789:0/5:$~M++h/0./; $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(26) ~JF$N { = −HI*NJ,$ = −(CDEDFGD − )*+,-.-/0) 
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In this example of using VDD, all constraints are eliminated. The values of the 4 attributes common 
to the government and the company mentioned earlier at the optimal design point and the value to 
the contractor from these attributes (optimal value) are given in Table 14. !
The following values of the attributes will be used at the beginning of the negotiation game 
between the government and the company as the first proposal made by the company. If given 
their way, the company would always want to have this attribute set to use for the design as it gives 
them the maximum payoff. An illustration for what the aircraft would look like using the 
company’s optimal attribute set is shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Optimal Attribute Values for Company 
Attribute Value 
Range (in km) 14054 
Mass of payload (in kg) 79,999 
Cruise velocity (in m/s) 454 
Stealth 0.4 
Value/Profit (in $B) 4.381 
!
!!
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Design of Aircraft Using Contractor’s Optimal Attribute Set 
! !
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Optimal Values for Government 
The government does its own analysis and brings forth a set of attributes that they think 
will fetch them the maximum value. In this case, the government wants to maximize its mission 
success. The optimal values of the 4 attributes for the government are described in Table 15. 
As can be seen from the obtained values, the government desires a system with exceptional 
characteristics that yields a fairly high chance of operational success. If given their way, the 
government would want this to be the final set of attributes. However, due to a difference in 
preferences of the players, a negotiation takes place to determine the final attributes to be designed 
for. An illustration for what the aircraft would look like using the company’s optimal attribute set 
is shown in Fig. 12. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Optimal Attribute Values for the Government 
Attribute Value 
Range (in km) 18000 
Mass of payload (in kg) 99687 
Cruise velocity (in m/s) 677.47 
Stealth 0.9 
Value/L(_ 3`) 0.721 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 12. Design of Aircraft Using Government’s Optimal Attribute Set 
!
!
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Bargaining over Attributes 
Example problem 
For the example problem, bargaining is done only over attribute £ñfor simplicity. To begin 
with, the optimal attribute set for each player 1 and player 2 are found, and the game begins with 
player 1 proposing his optimal solution. The blocks highlighted in yellow indicate the player 
making the offer in that round. Player 2 checks for his equilibrium condition using this attribute 
set as well as his own attribute set, using Eq. (25), and discovers that the equilibrium condition is 
not satisfied. The offer is rejected and the game continues to further rounds, till player 2 finally 
accepts the offer after 11 rounds of bargaining. After each round, the players modify their values 
of the attribute £ñ such that it lowers their own value obtained from this new attribute set and 
increases the other player’s value. The game moves in such a way that it tries to achieve middle 
ground, i.e. the players reduce their!respective values till an agreement point is reached, which is 
described in Fig. 13. The initial values of both players, the reduced values after each round, as well 
Table 16: Results for Bargaining over Attributes for Example Problem 
Round §é §í åé åí çèé çèí  ç•é ç•í Status 
1 [10 5 1] [10 1 10] 0.9 0.8 23.00 -11.00 78.00 129.00 
 
Rejected by 
player 2 
2 [10 5 2] [10 1 10] 0.9 0.8 21.00 -11.00 81.00 129.00 Rejected by 
player 1 
3 [10 5 2] [10 1 9] 0.9 0.8 21.00 -9.00 81.00 126.00 Rejected by 
player 2 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
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. 
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. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
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. 
. 
. 
. 
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. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
10 [10 5 6] [10 1 6] 0.9 0.8 13.00 -3.00 93.00 117..00 Rejected by 
player 1 
11 [10 5 6] [10 1 5] 0.9 0.8 13.00 -0.99 93.00 114.00 Accepted by 
player 2 
!
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as the final set of values after the players reached a common ground are shown in Table 16. The 
shaded blocks represent the proposing player for that round.!
Thus, the game ends with the final attribute set £ = (£Y, £ï, £ñ) = (10,5,6). The final 
equilibrium value of player 1 drops from 23 to 13 whereas the value of player 2 drops from 129 to 
93. Thus, the final solution after the bargaining game is as follows: 
ç∗ = çé, çí = (èë, ûë)!
!
Aircraft model 
The attribute bargain model that was successfully created for the example problem is then 
applied to the entire aircraft. Again, it is assumed that the government begins the negotiation by 
making the first offer. In this case, the discount factors for the players are kept constant, as are 
shown in Table 17. This initial offer made by the government is their optimal attribute set £5∗ , 
given in Table 15 that fetches them the maximum probability of operational success of 0.721. 
However, the company refuses this offer in round 1 because it yields them a value of $681.81M 
which does not meet their equilibrium condition as they believe that they can obtain a better value 
($4.31B) by waiting out till the next round and proposing their own attribute set. Thus, the game 
moves to round 2 where the company is the proposing player. The company proposes Ö>∗as this 
attribute set fetches the company a maximum profit of $4.318B. However, on plugging in the value 
of this proposed attribute set into their own value function, the government infers that they could 
!
Figure 13. Game of Bargaining for Example Problem 
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do much better by waiting for the next round (Eq. (24)). Thus, the offer made by the company is 
rejected and the game proceeds. 
In round 3, the government becomes the proposing player again. However, this time, the 
government proposes a new attribute set £54:2as their previous attribute set was rejected by the 
company. This new attribute set is attained by changing the value of range by 2% and then running 
an analysis using this new range to calculate the values of the other attributes. The new attribute 
set reduces the government’s value by 0.007%, i. e. the probability of operational success drops 
from 0.721 to 0.716. However, for this new set of attributes, the contractor’s profit sees a 
tremendous rise to $2.28B, from the initial $681.81M. The contractor compares this value to the 
value he could potentially obtain in the next round by proposing a modified attribute set. 
On checking for these values, he infers that the value on the table is greater than what he 
would make by waiting out till the next round, implying that his equilibrium condition given by 
Table 17: Results for Bargaining over Attributes for Aircraft Example (Sequential) 
Round §é §í åè å• çèé 
(%) 
çèí  
(%) 
ç•é 
(in $) 
ç•í 
(in $) 
Status 
1 CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 18000~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 99687ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 677.47`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.9  
 
CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 14054~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 80000ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 454.89`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.4  
 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
0.721 
 
 
0.392 
 
 
681.8 
M 
 
 
4.38 
B 
 
 
× 
2 CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 17640~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 99687ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 565.82`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.9  
 
CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 14054~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 80000ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 454.89`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.4  
 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
0.716 
 
 
0.392 
 
 
2.28B 
 
 
4.38B 
 
 
× 
3 CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 17640~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 99687ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 565.82`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.9  
 
CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 14335~LM(Ñ*Mz$(JF$îÄ) 80000ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 517.89`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.4  
 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
0.716 
 
 
0.394 
 
 
2.28B 
 
 
1.34B 
 
!!
 
!
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Eq. (25) is satisfied. Thus, the contractor accepts the offer and Ö54:2 is the final attribute set to be 
designed for.!The sequential game described above is shown in Table 17. The highlighted blocks 
represent the proposing player in each round. Table 18 shows the final values of the attributes used 
for!design!and the corresponding values of the company and the government for this attribute set. 
Thus, the final system design will yield a collective profit of $2.28B to the company and will have 
a 71.6% chance of achieving mission success. 
Fig. (14) pictorially demonstrates the negotiation game that takes place between the 
government and the contractor and depicts what the negotiated system may look like. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Final System Design and Values (Sequential Bargaining) 
Values of attributes Value to 
government 
p(OS) (%) 
Value to company 
(in $B) 
Final price 
per aircraft 
($M) CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 17640~h/0./;$(JF$îÄ) 99687ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 565.82`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.9  
 
 
 
0.716 
 
 
2.28 184.71 
!
!
Figure 14. Final System Design after Bargaining over Attributes 
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An interesting observation that can be made from Table 18 is that even though an 
assumption was made in this part of the study that the price of the system isn’t a factor that affects 
the decisions of the government, which may be unrealistic in the actual defense acquisitions world, 
it can be seen that negotiating solely over the attributes of the system does not drive the price paid 
by the government to an unrealistic amount, and yet results in a system with a good success 
probability and one that also results the contractor a commendable profit. 
 
Task 1: Random Bargaining 
Another variation of the bargaining game is one in which offers are made randomly by the 
players rather than following a fixed sequence shown in the above case. In this game, if an offer 
is rejected, there is no fixed order as to which player will make the offer in the following round. 
The player whose offer is rejected in the previous round can again make a new offer in the next 
round. These kind of bargaining games have as probability associated with the outcome that 
corresponds to the uncertainty associated with which player will make the next offer. The game 
begins by determining an expected attribute set (EA) that incorporates the probabilities of each 
player making the offer in the next round. The expected outcome can be calculated using Eq. (27), 
where “q” is the probability that player 1 (the government in this case) makes the proposing offer. 
Thus, the probability that player 2 (company) will offer in the following round is (1-q).  
c£ = ® ∗ Ö5 + 1 − ® ∗ Ö>$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(27)!
The proposing player uses the expected attribute set to evaluate his own payoff due to the 
uncertainty associated with him proposing the offer in the first place, when his first proposing offer 
again is his optimal attribute set, £5∗  for the government and £>∗  for the contractor for the example 
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considered here. The equilibrium strategies for the government and the company are given by Eq. 
(28) and Eq. (29) [70]. The notations used in the equations are the same as used previously.  
Ä∗ = Ö5 c£ , Ö> £5 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(28)!K∗ = Ö5 £> , Ö> c£ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(29)!
The government prefers attribute set £5∗  as the set to be used for design as it maximizes 
their value from the system whereas the company prefers £>∗ . After an offer has been rejected, the 
player who made the offer changes his attribute set such that it lowers his value and increases the 
value of the other player, in a bid to have his offer accepted in a later period. The new expected 
attribute set is calculated again that depends on the probabilities of the players making the next 
offer. Once a new offer is made by a player, the other player uses this attribute set to determine if 
he could gain more by waiting and proposing her own attribute set in the next period, keeping in 
mind the probability of him making the next offer. If he finds this to be true, he rejects the offer 
and the game moves to the next period. This continues till one of the players’ equilibrium condition 
is met and the offer is accepted. The equilibrium conditions for the government and the company 
for a game of random bargaining are shown in Eq. (30) and Eq. (31) [71]. 
Ö5 £> ≥ !Y ∗ Ö5 c£ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(30)!Ö> £5 ≥ !ï ∗ Ö> c£ $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$(31) 
The results from a game of random offers, when applied to the aircraft model, are shown in Table 
19. The game goes on for 31 rounds till contractor finally accepts the offer because. For this study, 
the probability q is generated in each round using a random number!generator. The table shows 
the value of the final attribute set and the payoffs of the government and the company from this 
game. 
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As can be seen from the table, even though the attributes of the system are very similar to 
those obtained from the game of sequential bargaining, the final values to the players is reduced 
because the game goes on for an extensive number of rounds, thereby reducing the value with 
every round.!
This concludes the second research question. A summary of the thesis as well as the potential 
studies that can be carried out as a continuation to this work will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Final System Design and Values (Random Bargaining) 
Values of attributes Value to 
government 
p(OS) (%) 
Value to 
company 
(in $M) 
Final price 
per aircraft 
($M) CMFÄD$(JF$îg) 17892.30~h/0./;$(JF$îÄ) 99687ÖDÑ*KJ,($(JF$g/+) 566.64`,DMÑ,ℎ$(%) 0.9  
 
 
 
0.620 
 
 
930.59 185.44 
!
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Summary and Conclusion 
Taking into account the various cost overruns, schedule delays and under performance 
issues related with the current defense acquisition processes, an effort is being made to address the 
issues in the current methods in order to obtain a better system design as well as yield a higher 
value to the contractors. This is achieved by using the two new approaches to defense acquisitions 
proposed in this research that aim at introducing a value-based outlook to defense acquisitions 
This research has shown how a combined price and performance-based value approach to 
contracting represents a transition from the traditional requirements-driven methods to a more 
value-based perspective. The research concentrated on only a small piece of negotiations in the 
otherwise tremendously complex defense acquisition processes and the negotiations were 
mathematically modeled using theory of bargaining in order to assist the decision-makers in 
making more informed decisions. The results obtained from the first approach, when compared to 
a traditional cost-based acquisition method, have shown that proposed idea yields exceedingly 
better results both in terms of the operational success of the aircraft that is the true preference of 
the government, as well as culminates into a much higher profit or value for the contractor. 
The second approach proposed in this research concentrates purely on value, and deals with 
negotiating directly over the attributes of the system that define the operational characteristics of 
the system. This has also shown that a value-based approach to negotiation over attributes results 
in a superior system design in terms of operational characteristics as well as results in a high profit 
to the contractor. This research has also demonstrated that even if the cost is not considered as in 
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important deciding factor for the government, the cost for the final system obtained after 
negotiation is not driven to an unrealistically high amount. 
Future Work 
!
This research holds tremendous potential for future work due to the possibility of 
exploration in numerous areas of defense acquisitions. With regards to the particular area of focus 
dealt with in this research, the incorporation of risk in design could be an interesting an important 
piece to study, because risk forms a major part in weapon system acquisitions. 
Another area of focus for future research could be studying the effect of changing the 
requirements on the payoffs of the players after an initial system has been negotiated upon. The 
effect of incentives in the combined acquisitions scenario as well as in the pure value approach 
would also be a thought-provoking piece to see if an improved performance is obtained. As this 
research only used the simple profit value function for the contractor and did not include a cost 
component in the value function for the government, using different and more realistic value 
functions to see the effect on the results would be an interesting part to be considered in the future. 
 
 
 
!
 
 
!
!
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APPENDIX A 
AIRCRAFT MODEL 
Appendix A will discuss the aircraft system subsystems, define the variables associated 
with these subsystems and describe the equations involved in each of the subsystem analysis. The 
entire analysis and model was programmed using Matlab [72]. 
Table A gives a list of the attributes and the corresponding design variables associated with 
each subsystem of the aircraft. 
 
Tiers for Company (Value function: Profit) Attributes Design variables 
SYSTEM (Bomber Aircraft) Cost, Revenue Number of Aircraft (n) 
  
 
 
 
Subsystem 
level 1 
(SS1) Wing 
C™´u¨ M™´u¨ Type of wing, Mass of payload 
(SS2) Fuselage 
CÆØ∞±t≤¨± MÆØ∞±t≤¨± Length of fuselage 
(SS3) Tail C≥≤´t M≥≤´t Material of tail, Type of tail 
(SS4) Landing gear 
Ctu¥¨±≤µ Mtu¥¨±≤µ Type of landing gear (tail dragger, tricycle,etc) 
(SS2) Engine 
C±u¨´u±, M±u¨´u± MÆØ±t, Range,$ V∫µØ´∞±  nªu¨, Type of engine  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsystem 
level 2 
 
Wings 
(SS1) Spar 
C∞º≤µ $M∞º≤µ$ Material of spar, Length of wing, Length of chord 
(SS2) Ribs Cµ´Ω∞ Mµ´Ω∞ Material$of$rib, Length$of$wing $Length$of$chord 
(SS3) Skin C∞…´u $Material$of$skin, Length of wing, Length of chord 
 
 
Fuselage 
(SS1)Frames 
 
CÆµ≤Ã±∞$ MÆµ≤Ã±∞$ nÆµ≤Ã±∞, Material$of$frame 
(SS2) Longerons 
CtŒu¨±µŒu $MtŒu¨±µŒu∞ ntŒu¨±µŒu∞, Material of longerons, Length of fuselage 
 
(SS3) Skin C∞…´u M∞…´u Material$of$skin  
 
Table A. List of design variables and attributes for aircraft 
system 
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Variable definitions 
!
Variables and 
Parameters 
Description Type Value 
σµ≤¥´≤tÃ≤– Maximum radial stress in N/m2  Calculated ---- σ≥≤u¨±u≥Ã≤– Maximum tangential stress in N/m2 Calculated ---- Assembly∫Œ∞≥ Assembly cost per tyre in $ Assumed 5000 D∫µØ´∞±‘ Drag for first cruise segment Calculated ---- d’÷ Diameter of landing gear in m Calculated ---- Fº±µÿŸ⁄¤ Force on each tyre in N Calculated ---- n≥‹µ± No. of tires Calculated ---- V∫µØ´∞±‘ Velocity in first cruise segment in 
m/s 
Calculated ---- 
V≥‹µ± Volume of tyre in m3 Calculated ---- W∫µØ´∞±‘ Total weight of aircraft at the 
beginning of first cruise segment 
 
Calculated ---- 
W∫µØ´∞±Y¤ﬁﬂ Weight of aircraft at the end of first 
cruise segment 
Calculated ---- 
W∫µØ´∞±ï¤ﬁﬂ Weight of aircraft at the end of 2nd 
cruise segment in N 
Calculated ---- 
W∫µØ´∞±Æµ≤∫ﬁ¤‡ Ratio of weights after and before 
cruise  
Assumed 0.6 
w’÷ Width of landing gear in m Calculated ---- ρ≤´µ‚⁄„‰Â¤ Density of air at cruise in kg/m3 Assumed 0.1875 ρ≥‹µ± Density of tyre in kg/m3 Referenced [73] 720 
A Location of pin 1 from the end of the 
spar 
Calculated ---- 
a1 Fractional distance between spar 1 
and CG  
Assumed 0.26 
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a2 Fractional distance between spar 2 
and CG  
Assumed 0.73 
Across Cross-sectional area of skin in m2 Calculated ---- 
AreaCS Area of cross section of fuselage in 
m2 
Calculated ---- 
Arealong Cross-sectional areal of longeron in 
m2 
Calculated ---- 
Arib Cross-sectional area of rib in m2 Calculated ---- 
Aspar Area of spar in m2 Calculated ---- 
B Distance between pins 1 and 2 Calculated ---- 
b1 Fractional distance between spar 1 
and CP 
Assumed 0.5 
b2 Fractional distance between spar 2 
and CP 
Assumed 0.5 
Base weight Assumed base weight of each tail Assumed ---- 
Cdto Coefficient of drag at takeoff Assumed 0.015 
Clcruise Coefficient of lift ar cruise Assumed 0.3 
Clto Coefficient of lift at takeoff Assumed 1.5 Cost≤tØÃ´uØÃÊ¤⁄ÁË Cost of aluminum per kg in $ Assumed 1.8 Cost∫≤µΩŒuÊ¤⁄ÁË$  Cost of carbon per kg in $ Assumed 140 CostÆØ±tÊ¤⁄ÁË Cost of per kg of fuel in $ Assumed 1000 CostµØΩΩ±µÊ¤⁄ÁË Cost of per kg of rubber in $ Assumed 800 Cost≥´≥≤u´ØÃÊ¤⁄ÁË  Cost of titanium per kg in $ Assumed 1800 
Costengine Cost of engines in $ Calculated ---- 
Costframe Cost of frame in $ Calculated ---- 
Costfuselage Cost of fuselage in $ Calculated ---- 
Costlong Cost of longeron in $ Calculated ---- 
Costmanu,ellip Cost of manufacturing an elliptical 
wing in$ 
Assumed 25M 
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Costmanu,rect Cost of manufacturing a rectangular 
wing in$ 
Assumed 10M 
Costmanufacturing Cost of manufacturing in $ Assumed ---- 
Costrib Cost of ribs in $ Calculated ---- 
Costrib Cost of rib in $ Calculated ---- 
Costskin Cost of skin in $ Calculated ---- 
Costskin Cost of skin in $ Calculated ---- 
Costspar Cost of spars in $ Calculated ---- 
Costspar Cost of spar in $ Calculated ---- 
Costtail Cost of tail in $ Calculated ---- 
Costtyre Total cost of tires in $ Calculated ---- 
Costwing Cost of wing in $ Calculated ---- 
D Drag in N Calculated ---- 
dfuselage Assumed initial diameter of fuselage 
in m 
Assumed 3 
Fhorz Horizontal force on ribs in N Calculated ---- 
Findividual Force on a single rib in N Calculated ---- 
flight time1 Time taken to cover Range1 Calculated ---- 
ForceLG Force on landing gear during landing 
in N 
Calculated ---- 
Fpara Net force acting horizontally in N Calculated ---- 
Fperp Net force acting vertically in N Calculated ---- 
Framematerial Material of frame Calculated ---- 
Fsection Force on a section in a rib in N Calculated ---- 
Fvert Vertical force on ribs in N Calculated ---- 
Heightrib Height of rib in m Assumed 0.24 
Heightspar Initial guess for height of spar Assumed 0.2 
Ilong Moment of inertia of longeron in m4 Calculated ---- 
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Irib Moment of inertia of rib in m4 Calculated ---- 
Ispar Moment of inertia of spar in m4 Calculated ---- 
L Lift in N Calculated ---- 
L/D Lift to frag ratio Assumed 15 
lchord Length of chord in m Calculated ---- 
Longeronmaterial Material of longeron Calculated ---- 
lwing Length of wing in m Calculated ---- MassÆØ±t‚⁄„‰Â¤ Total mass of fuel consumed during 
cruise in kg 
Calculated ---- 
MassÆØ±t‚⁄„‰Â¤‘ Mass of fuel consumed in cruise 
segment 1 in kg 
Calculated ---- 
MassÆØ±tﬁ¤‡ Assumed new mass of fuel in kg 
 
Assumed 10000 
MassÆØ±tÈÍﬂ Assumed old mass of fuel in kg Assumed 1000 MasstŒu¨ﬁ¤‡  Assumed new mass of longerons in 
$ 
Assumed 1000 
MasstŒu¨ÈÍﬂ  Assumed old mass of longerons in $ Assumed 100 
Massengine Mass of engine in kg Calculated ---- 
Massengine Mass of engines in kg Calculated ---- 
Massfittings Mass of fittings in $ Assumed 5000 
Massframe Mass of frame in kg Calculated ---- 
Massfuel Mass of fuel in kg Calculated ---- 
Massfuselage Mass of fuselage in kg Calculated ---- 
Massfuselage Mass of fuselage in kg Calculated ---- 
Masslandinggear  Mass of landing gear in kg Calculated ---- 
Masspayload Mass of payload in kg Calculated ---- 
Massrib Mass of rib in kg Calculated ---- 
Massskin Mass of skin in kg Calculated ---- 
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Massspar Mass of spar in kg Calculated ---- 
Masstail  Mass of tail in kg Calculated ---- 
Masstail Mass of tail in kg Calculated ---- 
Masstyre Mass of tires in kg Calculated ---- 
Mbend Maximum bending moment on spar Calculated ---- 
Mij Bending moment at different points i 
on the two spars j 
Calculated ---- 
Mij Bending moment at different points i 
on each longeron j 
Calculated ---- 
nengine No. of engines Calculated ---- 
Nribs No. of ribs in wing Assumed 5 
Patm Atmospheric pressure at an assumed 
maximum altitude of 50000 ft 
Referenced [74] 12000 
Pfuselage Pressure on fuselage in N/m2 Calculated ---- 
Pindividual Pressure on a single frame in N/m2 Calculated ---- 
Pinternal Cabin pressure at 7000 ft in N/m2 Referenced 80000 
Plongeron Pressure on a single longeron in 
N/m2 
Calculated ---- 
Ppayload Pressure due to payload in N/m2 Calculated ---- 
Ptotal Total internal pressure in fuselage in 
N/m2 
Calculated ---- 
R Resultant force in N Calculated ---- 
Range Total range in km Calculated ---- 
Range1 Range covered during first cruise 
segment in m 
Calculated ---- 
ri Initial assumed inner diameter of 
fuselage in m 
Calculated ---- 
ro Initial assumed outer diameter of 
fuselage in m 
Assumed 1.5 
Rtensile Tensile load in N Calculated ---- 
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SFC Specific fuel consumption Referenced [75] ---- 
Skinmaterial Material of skin Calculated ---- 
Sparmaterial Material of spar Calculated ---- 
Stress1 Maximum stress on spar 1 Calculated ---- 
Stress2 Maximum stress on spar 2 Calculated ---- 
Stressframe Maximum stress on frame in N/m2 Calculated ---- 
Stressmax Maximum of stresses on spars 1 & 2 Calculated ---- 
Swing Area of wing in m2 Calculated ---- 
Tailmaterial Material of tail Calculated ---- 
tframe Thickness of frame in m Assumed 0.4 
TSFC Thrust specific fuel consumption Referenced [75] ---- 
tskin Thickness of skin in m Assumed 0.0012 
Tstress Tensile stress on skin in N/m2 Calculated ---- 
Typeengine Type of engine Calculated ---- 
Uij Shear force 1 at different points i for 
the two spars j 
Calculated ---- 
Ultiframe Ultimate strength of material of 
frame in N/m2 
Referenced [73] ---- 
Ultilong Ultimate strength of material of 
longeron in N/m2 
Referenced [73] ---- 
Ultirib Ultimate strength of material of rib Referenced [73] ---- 
Ultiskin Ultimate strength of material of skin 
in N/m2 
Referenced [73] ---- 
Ultispar Ultimate strength of material of spar 
in N/m2 
Referenced [73] ---- 
Vij Shear force 2 at different points i for 
the two spars j 
Calculated ---- 
Volumeframe Volume of frame in kg/m3 Calculated ---- 
Volumelong Volume of longeron in m3 Calculated ---- 
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Volumerib Volume of rib in kg/m3 Calculated ---- 
Volumeskin Volume of skin in m3 Calculated ---- 
Volumespar Volume of spar in kg/m3 Calculated ---- 
Vto Takeoff velocity in m/s Assumed 120 WeightÆØ±tÍÎﬁﬂ‰ﬁË Weight of fuel consumed during 
landing in N 
Calculated ---- 
WeightÆØ±tÿÎÁ¤ÈÏÏ Weight of fuel consumed during 
takeoff in N 
Calculated ---- 
Wfinal Weight at the beginning of landing 
segment in N 
Calculated ---- 
Wi Load perpendicular to the plane on 
resolving R in N 
Calculated ---- 
Widthlongeron Initial assumed length of longeron in 
m 
Assumed 0.05 
Widthrib Width of rib in m Assumed 0.04 
Widthspar Initial guess for width of spar Assumed 0.05 
Wii Load along the plane on resolving R 
in N 
Calculated ---- 
Wlanding Weight at the end of landing 
segment in N 
Calculated ---- 
Wto Total weight of aircraft at takeoff in 
N 
Calculated ---- 
ylong Distance from neutral axis in m Calculated ---- 
yrib Distance from neutral axis to edge of 
rib in m 
Calculated ---- 
yspar Distance from neutral axis to edge of 
spar in m 
Calculated ---- 
Zlong Section modulus for longeron Calculated ---- 
Zrib Sectional modulus of rib Calculated ---- 
Zspar Section modulus for spar Calculated ---- 
αto Angle of attack at takeoff in degrees Assumed 12 
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ρair Density of air at sea level in kg/m3 Approximated 1.125 
ρaluminum Density of aluminum in kg/m3 Referenced [73] 2700 
ρcarbon Density of carbon fiber in kg/m3 Referenced [73] 1900 
ρframe Density of material of frame in 
kg/m3 
Referenced [73] ---- 
ρlong Density of material of longeron in 
kg/m3 
Referenced [73] ---- 
ρspar Density of material of spar in kg/m3 Referenced [73] ---- 
ρtitanium Density of titanium in kg/m3 Referenced [73] 4500 
ρwood Density of wood in kg/m3 Referenced [73] 160 
σbend Bending stress Calculated ---- 
σburst Bursting force in N Calculated ---- 
σshear Maximum shear stress Calculated ---- 
!
Wing 
Wing (SSL1) `2345 = Ñ2345 ∗ Ñ>}.<; Ì-. = ~M++h/0./; + ~M++789:0/5: + ~M++0/4;3455:/< + ~M++-/30+ ~M++:4534: + ~M++78:0 ∗ 9.81 )*+,2345= )*+,9h/< + )*+,<3Ó + )*+,9Ô34 + )*+,ì/48,<:>-,$$$$$$JN$IDK,MFÄGÑMI$JFÄ$$)*+,9h/< + )*+,<3Ó + )*+,9Ô34 + )*+,ì/48,:003h,$$$$$$$$$$$$$JN$DÑÑJL,JKMÑ$JFÄ  ~M++2345 = ~M++9h/< + ~M++<3Ó + ~M++73--3459 
 
Wing (SSL2_SS1 – Spars) `2345 = Ñ2345 ∗ Ñ>}.<; | = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )Ñ-. ∗ `2345!Ú = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )z-. ∗ `2345!
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Û9h/< = Jz,ℎ9h/< ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,9h/<ñ12 !£9h/< = Jz,ℎ9h/< ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,9h/< !( = ℎDJÄℎ,9h/<2 !Ù = Û/(!bh:<hY = Mï ∗ | − ıï ∗ Ì-.!bh/</Y = Mï ∗ Ú!CY = bh:<hYï + bh/</Yï !bh:<hï = Mï ∗ | − ıY ∗ Ì-.!bh/</ï = MY ∗ Ú!Cï = bh:<hïï + bh/</ïï !ÌY = CY cos α≥Œ !ÌYY = CY ∗ +JF(˜-.)!Ìï = Cï cos α≥Œ !Ìïï = Cï ∗ +JF(˜-.)!£ = Ñ23456 !ò = Ñ23453 !~1Y = ÌY ∗ £ï2 = ~3Y!~2Y = ÌY ∗ òï8 !~Ó:4;Y = max ~1Y,~2Y !˘Ó:4;Y = ~Ó:4;YÙ !˙1Y = ÌY ∗ £!Ö1Y = ~2Y − ~1Yò −ÌY ∗ ò2 !˙2Y = Ö1Y + ÌY ∗ ò!Ö2Y = ~3Y − ~2Yò −ÌY ∗ ò2 !
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˙3Y = Ö2Y + ÌY ∗ ò!Ö3Y = 0 − ~3Y£ −ÌY ∗ £2 !
9˘}:/< = max ˙1Y, Ö1Y, ˙2Y, Ö2Y, ˙3Y, Ö3Y£9h/< !`,ID++Y = ˘Ó:4;Y,$$$$$JN$˘Ó:4;Y > 9˘}:/<Y$9˘}:/<Y,$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$37$¸?˝˛mn‘ˇ¸!˛"B‘ !~1ï = Ìï ∗ £ï2 = ~3ï!~2ï = Ìï ∗ òï8 !~Ó:4;ï = max ~1ï,~2ï !˘Ó:4;ï = ~Ó:4;ïÙ !˙1ï = Ìï ∗ £!Ö1ï = ~2ï − ~1ïò −Ìï ∗ ò2 !˙2ï = Ö1ï + Ìï ∗ ò!Ö2ï = ~3ï − ~2ïò −Ìï ∗ ò2 !˙3ï = Ö2ï + Ìï ∗ ò!Ö3ï = 0 − ~3ï£ −Ìï ∗ £2 !
9˘}:/<ï = max ˙1ï, Ö1ï, ˙2ï, Ö2ï, ˙3ï, Ö3ï£9h/< !`,ID++ï = ˘Ó:4;ï,$$$$$JN$˘Ó:4;ï > 9˘}:/<ï$9˘}:/<ï,$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$37$¸?˝˛mn#ˇ¸!˛"B# !`,ID++ì/$ = `,ID++Y,$$$$$$JN$`,ID++Y > `,ID++ï`,ID++ï,$$$$$$JN$`,ID++Y < `,ID++ï!
{$JN$`LMIì/-:<3/0 = Ì**z!Ò9h/< = 160 îÄgñ!˙Ñ,J9h/< = 40 ∗ 10ã =gï!ℎJÑD$`,ID++ì/$ > ˙Ñ,J9h/< !Jz,ℎ9h/< = Jz,ℎ9h/< + 0.001!
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ℎDJÄℎ,9h/< = 4 ∗ Jz,ℎ9h/< !)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++ì/$!DFz!DFz}!Ö*ÑGgD9h/< = Ñ2345 ∗ Jz,ℎ9h/< ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,9h/< !~M++9h/< = Ò9h/< ∗ Ö*ÑGgD9h/< !)*+,9h/< = )*+,9h/<h:<&.08ì: ∗ Ö*ÑGgD9h/< !
{$JN$`LMIì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg!Ò9h/< = 2700 îÄgñ!˙Ñ,J9h/< = 483 ∗ 10ã =gï!ℎJÑD$`,ID++ì/$ > ˙Ñ,J9h/< !Jz,ℎ9h/< = Jz,ℎ9h/< + 0.001!ℎDJÄℎ,9h/< = 4 ∗ Jz,ℎ9h/< !)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++ì/$!DFz!DFz}!Ö*ÑGgD9h/< = Ñ2345 ∗ Jz,ℎ9h/< ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,9h/< !~M++9h/< = Ò9h/< ∗ Ö*ÑGgD9h/< !)*+,9h/< = )*+,9h/<'˛n() ∗ ~M++9h/< !
!
Wing (SSL2_SS2 – Ribs) 
! `2345 = Ñ2345 ∗ Ñ>}.<; | = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )Ñ-. ∗ `2345!Ú = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )z-. ∗ `2345!bh:<h = | −Ì-.!b}.<* = Ú!C = bh:<hï + b}.<*ï !
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b&:<- = C ∗ cos$(˜-.)!bℎ*I+ = C ∗ sin ˜-. !b34;3&3;8/0 = b&:<-F<3Ó9 !b9:>-3.4 = b34;3&3;8/03 !ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó = 6 ∗ Jz,ℎ<3Ó!Û = Jz,ℎ<3Ó ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,<3Óñ12 !£<3Ó = Jz,ℎ<3Ó ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó!( = ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó2 !Ù = Û(!˘Ó:4;Y = b9:>-3.4 ∗ |YÙ !˘Ó:4;ï = b9:>-3.4 ∗ M ∗ ıM + ı ∗ Ù !˘Ó:4;ñ = b9:>-3.4 ∗ |ïÙ !
9˘}:/< = b9:>-3.4£<3Ó !`,ID++ì/$ = max ˘Ó:4;Y, ˘Ó:4;ï, ˘Ó:4;ñ, 9˘}:/< !
{$JN$CJıì/-:<3/0 = Ì**z!Ò<3Ó = 160 îÄgñ!˙Ñ,J<3Ó = 40 ∗ 10ã =gï!ℎJÑD$`,ID++ì/$ > ˙Ñ,J<3Ó!Jz,ℎ<3Ó = Jz,ℎ<3Ó + 0.001!ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó = 6 ∗ Jz,ℎ<3Ó!)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++ì/$!DFz!DFz}!Ö*ÑGgD<3Ó = Ñ>}.<; ∗ Jz,ℎ<3Ó ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó!
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~M++<3Ó = Ò<3Ó ∗ Ö*ÑGgD<3Ó!)*+,<3Ó = )*+,<3Óh:<&.08ì: ∗ Ö*ÑGgD<3Ó!
{$JN$CJıì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg!Ò<3Ó = 2700 îÄgñ!˙Ñ,J<3Ó = 483 ∗ 10ã =gï!ℎJÑD$`,ID++ì/$ > ˙Ñ,J<3Ó!Jz,ℎ<3Ó = Jz,ℎ<3Ó + 0.001!ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó = 6 ∗ Jz,ℎ<3Ó!)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++ì/$!DFz!DFz}!Ö*ÑGgD<3Ó = Ñ>}.<; ∗ Jz,ℎ<3Ó ∗ ℎDJÄℎ,<3Ó!~M++<3Ó = Ò<3Ó ∗ Ö*ÑGgD<3Ó!)*+,<3Ó = )*+,<3Ó'˛n() ∗ ~M++<3Ó!
!
Wing (SSL2_SS3 – Skin) 
! `2345 = Ñ2345 ∗ Ñ>}.<; !Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34 = ,9Ô34 ∗ `2345!| = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )Ñ-. ∗ `2345!Ú = 0.5 ∗ Ò/3< ∗ Ö-.ï ∗ )z-. ∗ `2345!bh:<h = | −Ì-.!b}.<* = Ú!C = bh:<hï + b}.<*ï !C-:4930: = C ∗ sin ˜-. !£><.99 = Ñ>}.<; ∗ ,9Ô34!É9-<:99 = C-:4930:£><.99 !{JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg$MÑÑ*(!
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˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 310 ∗ 10ã =gï!ℎJÑD$É9-<:99 > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34!,9Ô34 = ,9Ô34 + 0.0001!)MÑKGÑM,D$É9-<:99!DFz!
! ! ~M++9Ô34 = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34 ∗ Ò/08ì348ì!)*+,9Ô34 = )*+,/08ì348ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34!
!DÑ+D$JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = )MIı*F$NJıDI!˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 600 ∗ 10ã!ℎJÑD$É9-<:99 > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34!,9Ô34 = ,9Ô34 + 0.0001!)MÑKGÑM,D$É9-<:99!DFz!
! ! ~M++9Ô34 = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34 ∗ Ò>/<Ó.4!)*+,9Ô34 = )*+,>/<Ó.4'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34!DÑ+J$JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = ÉJ,MFJGg$MÑÑ*(!˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 950 ∗ 10ã!ℎJÑD$É9-<:99 > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34!,9Ô34 = ,9Ô34 + 0.0001!)MÑKGÑM,D$É9-<:99!DFz!
! ! ~M++9Ô34 = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34 ∗ Ò-3-/438ì!)*+,9Ô34 = )*+,-3-/438ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34!
!DÑ+D$JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = )MIı*F$NJıDI!˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 600 ∗ 10ã!ℎJÑD$É9-<:99 > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34!,9Ô34 = ,9Ô34 + 0.0001!)MÑKGÑM,D$É9-<:99!
83 
 
 
DFz}!
!
Fuselage ~M++789:0/5: = ~M++7</ì: + ~M++0.45:<.49 + ~M++9Ô34789:0/5: )*+,789:0/5: = )*+,ì/487/>-8<345 + )*+,7</ì: + )*+,0.45:<.49+ )*+,9Ô34789:0/5:  
Fuselage (SSL2_SS1 – Frames) 
! £IDMri = O ∗ I.ï − I3ï  Hh/0./; = ~M++h/0./; ∗ 9.81£IDMri  H-.-/0 = H34-:<4/0 + Hh/0./; H34;3&3;8/0pnmj˛ = H-.-/0F7</ì:9 
<˘/;3/0ì/$ = H34;3&3;8/0 
-˘/45:4-ì/$ = H34;3&3;8/0 ∗ I3ï + I.ïI.ï − I3ï  `,ID++7</ì: = max <˘/;3/0ì/$ , -˘/45:4-ì/$  {JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg$MÑÑ*(!Ò7</ì: = 2700!˙Ñ,J7</ì: = 483 ∗ 10ã!ℎJÑD$`,ID++7</ì: > ˙Ñ,J7</ì: !z789:0/5: = z789:0/5: − 0.01!)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++7</ì: !DFz!Ö*ÑGgD7</ì: = 2 ∗ O ∗ I. − I3 ∗ ,7</ì: !
! ! ~M++9Ô34 = Ö*ÑGgD7</ì: ∗ Ò7</ì: !)*+,7</ì: = )*+,/08ì348ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++7</ì: !
!
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DÑ+D$JN$`îJFì/-:<3/0 = )MIı*F$NJıDI!Ò7</ì: = 1600!˙Ñ,J7</ì: = 600 ∗ 10ã!ℎJÑD$`,ID++7</ì: > ˙Ñ,J7</ì: !z789:0/5: = z789:0/5: − 0.01!)MÑKGÑM,D$`,ID++7</ì: !DFz!Ö*ÑGgD7</ì: = 2 ∗ O ∗ I. − I3 ∗ ,7</ì: !
! ! ~M++9Ô34 = Ö*ÑGgD7</ì: ∗ Ò7</ì: !)*+,7</ì: = )*+,>/<Ó.4'˛n() ∗ ~M++7</ì: !DFz}!~M++7</ì: = ~M++7</ì: ∗ F7</ì:9!)*+,7</ì: = )*+,7</ì: ∗ F7</ì:9!
!
Fuselage (SSL2_SS2 – Longerons) {ℎJÑD$Mı+ ~M++0.45@AB − ~M++0.45"˛. > 10]ã ~M++0.45@AB = ~M++0.45"˛. H789:0/5: = ~2345 + ~:ìh/44/5: + ~0/4;3455:/< + ~h/0./; + ~M++78:0+ ~M++0.45"˛. ∗ 9.81 H0.45:<.4 = H789:0/5:F0.45:<.49 Û0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.45/12  (0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.452  Ù0.45 = Û0.45(0.45 £IDM0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.45ï  £0.45 = |789:0/5:6  ò0.45 = |789:0/5:3  
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~1YA@") = H0.45:<.4 ∗ £0.45ï2 = ~3YA@") ~2YA@") = H0.45:<.4 ∗ ò0.45ï8  ~Ó:4;A@") = max ~1YA@") , ~2YA@")  ˘Ó:4;A@") = ~Ó:4;A@")Ù0.45  {JN$|*FÄDI*Fì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg$MÑÑ*( Ò0.45 = 2700$ ˙Ñ,J0.45 = 483 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó:4;A@") > ˙Ñ,J0.45 ÌJz,ℎ0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.45 + 0.001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó:4;A@") DFz 
   Ö*ÑGgD0.45 = £IDM0.45 ∗ |789:0/5: 
   ~M++0.45"˛. = Ö*ÑGgD0.45 ∗ Ò0.45 ∗ F0.45:<.49 
   )*+,0.45 = )*+,/08ì348ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++0.45"˛. 
 DÑ+D$JN$|*FÄDI*Fì/-:<3/0 = )MIı*F$NJıDI Ò0.45 = 1600$ ˙Ñ,J0.45 = 600 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó:4;A@") > ˙Ñ,J0.45 ÌJz,ℎ0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.45 + 0.001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó:4;A@") DFz 
   Ö*ÑGgD0.45 = £IDM0.45 ∗ |789:0/5: 
   ~M++0.45"˛. = Ö*ÑGgD0.45 ∗ Ò0.45 ∗ F0.45:<.49 
   )*+,0.45 = )*+,>/<Ó.4'˛n() ∗ ~M++0.45"˛. 
 DÑ+D$JN$|*FÄDI*Fì/-:<3/0 = ÉJ,MFJGg 
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Ò0.45 = 4500$ ˙Ñ,J0.45 = 950 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó:4;A@") > ˙Ñ,J0.45 ÌJz,ℎ0.45 = ÌJz,ℎ0.45 + 0.001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó:4;A@") DFz 
   Ö*ÑGgD0.45 = £IDM0.45 ∗ |789:0/5: 
   ~M++0.45"˛. = Ö*ÑGgD0.45 ∗ Ò0.45 ∗ F0.45:<.49 
   )*+,0.45 = )*+,-3-/438ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++0.45"˛. 
   DFz} 
  DFz} 
 
Fuselage (SSL2_SS3 – Skin) 
!
! ! £IDMri = O ∗ I.ï − I3ï !
! ! Hh/0./; = 0/99'mkA@mB∗1.2Y3<:/45 !
! ! H-.-/0 = H34-:<4/0 + Hh/0./; !
! ! ΔH = H-.-/0 − H/-ì!
! ! ˘Ó8<9- = 7l∗;p8?˛Am)˛ï∗-?(W"p8?˛Am)˛!{JN$bG+DÑMÄD9Ô34jmq˛nWmA = £ÑGgJFGg$MÑÑ*( Ò0.45 = 2700$ ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 310 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó8<9- > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ + 0.0001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó8<9- DFz 
  Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = O ∗ |789:0/5: ∗ ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ (z789:0/5: − ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛) 
  ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ Ò9Ô34 
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  )*+,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = )*+,/08ì348ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ 
 DÑ+D$JN$bG+DÑMÄD9Ô34jmq˛nWmA = )MIı*F$NJıDI Ò0.45 = 1900$ ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 600 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó8<9- > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ + 0.0001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó8<9- DFz 
  Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = O ∗ |789:0/5: ∗ ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ (z789:0/5: − ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛) 
  ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ Ò9Ô34 
  )*+,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = )*+,>/<Ó.4'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ 
 JN$bG+DÑMÄD9Ô34jmq˛nWmA = ÉJ,MFJGg$MÑÑ*( Ò0.45 = 4500$ ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 = 950 ∗ 10ã ℎJÑD$˘Ó8<9- > ˙Ñ,J9Ô34 ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ + 0.0001 )MÑKGÑM,D$˘Ó8<9- DFz 
  Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = O ∗ |789:0/5: ∗ ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ (z789:0/5: − ,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛) 
  ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = Ö*ÑGgD9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ ∗ Ò9Ô34 
  )*+,9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ = )*+,-3-/438ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++9Ô34p8?˛Am)˛ 
! ! DFz!
!
Engine 
Engine (SSL1) 
! ! b*I$cFÄJFD-h: = 1, 2$*I$3!
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! ! ~M++:4534: = ~M++$LDI$DFÄJFD ∗ F:4534:9!
! ! )*+,:4534: = )*+,$LDI$DFÄJFD ∗ F:4534:9!
! ! {ℎJÑD$ Mı+ ~M++78:0@AB − ~M++78:0"˛. > 10]ã!
! ! ~M++78:0@AB = ~M++78:0"˛. ! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Ì-. = ~M++2345 + ~M++h/0./; + ~M++789:0/5: + ~M++0/4;3455:/< + ~M++-/30 +~M++:4534: + ~M++78:0"˛. ∗ 9.81!
! ! Ì><839:‘ = Ì-. ∗ 0.95545!
! ! Ö><839:‘ = ï∗9on8W?˛‘:mWnon8W?˛∗r0on8W?˛∗i.W")!
! ! Ú><839:‘ = 9on8W?˛‘;< !
! ! ÌDJÄℎ,78:0qm(˛@pp = Ì-. − Ì><839:‘ !
! ! CMFÄDY = =on8W?˛‘i>r ∗ 9on8W?˛‘?on8W?˛‘ ∗ log Y9on8W?˛pnmo"˛. !
! ! NÑJÄℎ,$,JgDY = @/45:‘=on8W?˛‘!
! ! ~M++78:0on8W?˛‘ = É`b) ∗ NÑJÄℎ,$,JgDY ∗ Ú><839:‘ !
! ! Ì><839:Y˛"B = Ì><839:‘ − ~M++78:0on8W?˛‘ ∗ 9.81!
! ! CMFÄD = 2.05 ∗ CMFÄDY!
! ! ~M++78:0on8W?˛ = 2 ∗ ~M++78:0on8W?˛‘ !
! ! Ì><839:ï˛"B = Ì><839:‘ − ~M++78:0on8W?˛ + ~M++h/0./; ∗ 9.81!
! ! Ì734/0 = Ì><839:ï˛"B ∗ 0.995!
! ! ÌDJÄℎ,78:0Am"BW") = Ì><839:ï˛"B − Ì734/0 !
! ! ~M++78:0qm(˛@pp = 9:35}-p8˛Aqm(˛@pp1.2Y !
! ! ~M++78:0Am"BW") = 9:35}-p8˛AAm"BW")1.2Y !
! ! ~M++78:0"˛. = ~M++78:0qm(˛@pp + ~M++78:0on8W?˛ + ~M++78:0Am"BW") !
! ! )*+,78:0 = )*+,78:0'˛n() ∗ ~M++78:0"˛. !
! ! )*+,:4534: ∗ )*+,:4534: + )*+,78:0 !
! ! DFz}!
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!
! ! ~M++<:-8<4 = 9on8W?˛#˛"B1.2Y !
!
Tail   
Tail (SSL1) 
! ! b*I$,MJÑ = )*FEDF,J*FMÑ,A − ,MJÑ$*I$Ö − ,MJÑ,!
! ! {JN$,MJÑì/-:<3/0 = £ÑGgJFGg$MÑÑ*(!
! ! ~M++-/30 = òM+D$DJÄℎ, ∗ 2.5!
! ! )*+,-/30 = )*+,/08ì348ì'˛n() ∗ ~M++-/30 !
! ! DÑ+D$JN$,MJÑì/-:<3/0 = )MIı*F$NJıDI!
! ! ~M++-/30 = òM+D$DJÄℎ, ∗ 1.25!
! ! )*+,-/30 = )*+,>/<Ó.4'˛n() ∗ ~M++-/30 !
! ! DFz}!
! ! )*+,-/30q@qmA = )*+,-/30 + )*+,ì/487/>-8<:$!
!
Landing gear 
Landing gear (SSL1) 
! ! Ì0/4;345 = 0.995 ∗ ~M++<:-8<4!
! ! b*IKDBC = Ì0/4;345 ∗ 9.81!
! ! {JN$É(LDBC = òJK(KÑD!
! ! F-<: = 2!
! ! bh:<qkn˛ = >.<>:;D4qkn˛ !
! ! zBC = 0.0163 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U.ñYE !
! ! BC = 0.01043 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U.ñYE !
! ! Ö-<: = V/ ∗ zBCï − BCï ∗ BC !
! ! ~M++-<: = Ö-<: ∗ Ò-<: ∗ 4qkn˛YUUUUU!
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! ! £++DgıÑ(>.9- = £++DgıÑ(>.9- ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,ì/48qkn˛ = )*+,<8ÓÓ:<'˛n() ∗ ~M++-<: ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,-<: = £++DgıÑ(>.9- + )*+,ì/48qkn˛ !
! DÑ+D$JN$É(LDBC = ÉIJK(KÑD!
! ! F-<: = 3!
! ! bh:<qkn˛ = >.<>:;D4qkn˛ !
! ! zBC = 0.0163 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U.ñYE !
! ! BC = 0.1043 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U./2U !
! ! Ö-<: = V/ ∗ zBCï − BCï ∗ BC !
! ! ~M++-<: = Ö-<: ∗ Ò-<: ∗ 4qkn˛YUUUUU!
! ! £++DgıÑ(>.9- = £++DgıÑ(>.9- ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,ì/48qkn˛ = )*+,<8ÓÓ:<'˛n() ∗ ~M++-<: ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,-<: = £++DgıÑ(>.9- + )*+,ì/48qkn˛ !
! DÑ+D$JN$É(LDBC = FGMzIJK(KÑD!
! ! F-<: = 4!
! ! bh:<qkn˛ = >.<>:;D4qkn˛ !
! ! zBC = 0.0163 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U.ñYE !
! ! BC = 0.01043 ∗ bh:<qkn˛U./2U !
! ! Ö-<: = V/ ∗ zBCï − BCï ∗ BC !
! ! ~M++-<: = Ö-<: ∗ Ò-<: ∗ 4qkn˛YUUUUU!
! ! £++DgıÑ(>.9- = £++DgıÑ(>.9- ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,ì/48qkn˛ = )*+,<8ÓÓ:<'˛n() ∗ ~M++-<: ∗ F-<: !
! ! )*+,-<: = £++DgıÑ(>.9- + )*+,ì/48qkn˛ !
! ! DFz}!
